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ABSTRACT 
Disruption theory tells us that certain innovations can undermine existing products, 
firms, or even entire industries. Classic examples include the Kodak camera, the Bell 
telephone, and the Ford Model T. Modern examples abound. The market entrant’s 
innovation ultimately displaces industry incumbents. Regulators, too, are challenged by such 
disruptive innovations. The new product, technology, or business practice may fall within an 
agency’s jurisdiction but not square well with the agency’s existing regulatory framework. 
Call this “regulatory disruption.”  
Most scholars intuit that regulators should be cautious rather than firm in such 
situations. Tim Wu, in Agency Threats, argues that agencies confronting disruptive innovations 
should avoid traditional rulemaking and adjudication, and instead rely on “threats” packaged 
in guidance documents, warning letters, and the like. Threats, he argues, are less 
burdensome, more flexible, and avoid regulation that is miscalibrated or premature. 
However, this Article argues that a flexible initial posture based primarily on “threats” can 
calcify, creating weak defaults that lead to suboptimal regulation in the long term. Regulatory 
inertia can be hard to break without an external shock, usually a tragedy or some other 
massive failure that reignites interest in regulation. As a case study, this Article shows how 
the FDA’s approach to a disruptive technology (computerized medical devices) twenty-five 
years ago fits the threat framework strikingly well, and how it failed. The FDA’s threats 
became stale and counterproductive—during a profound computer revolution, no less. This 
Article counterposes the FDA’s approach to software with the FCC’s approach to the 
Internet, which initially relied on threats, but later codified them via binding regulations and 
enforcement shortly thereafter. 
This Article argues that agencies need not be so tentative with innovations. If agencies 
are concerned about regulating prematurely or in error, then they can experiment with 
timing rules, alternative enforcement mechanisms, and other variations on traditional 
interventions. If agencies do choose to proceed by making threats, then they should use 
them as a short-term precursor to more decisive, legally binding action, as the FCC did, and 
avoid relying on them as a long-term crutch, as the FDA did. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A persistent challenge for regulators is confronting new technologies or 
business practices that do not square well with existing regulatory 
frameworks. These innovations can depart in important ways from older 
incumbents. For example, the innovation might present unanticipated 
benefits and risks. It might disturb carefully crafted equilibria between 
regulators, industry, and consumers. The innovation might puncture 
prevailing regulatory orthodoxies, forcing regulators to reorient their 
postures or even rethink their underlying statutory authority. The 
quintessential example is the Internet, which rumpled not just one, but 
several regulatory frameworks, including those of the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”), the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”), and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).1 
 
 1. For the FCC’s experience adapting its longstanding regulatory framework to 
Internet providers, see infra Section III.C. For the FTC’s experience adapting its 
longstanding frameworks for privacy, marketing fraud, and antitrust violations to online 
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Periodically, our economy generates these “disruptive innovations.”2 
Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen introduced the idea to describe new 
technologies that undermine and eventually displace established products, 
firms, or even entire industries. Iconic examples include automobiles, 
personal computing, and cellular phones. But the idea’s explanatory power 
extends to many other products and industries. As a result, disruption theory 
has inspired prolific writing in the business academy and now creeps into 
other disciplines.3 
Here, this Article uses the idea to refer to innovations that disrupt 
existing regulatory schemes, not necessarily industry incumbents (though 
they may do that too). Call this “regulatory disruption.” Legal scholars have 
examined disruptive innovation in various disciplines, such as civil 
 
activities, see, for example, Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How Net 
Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1652–82 (2011) (comparing the 
suitability of FCC regulation versus FTC antitrust jurisdiction in crafting net neutrality 
policies); Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 
2041, 2053 (2000) (using public choice theory to explain the FTC’s approach to online 
privacy); Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Optimizing Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 72 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1497, 1605–22 (2004) (considering in detail the FTC’s regulation of online 
consumer fraud from a microeconomic and game-theoretical perspective). For an amusing 
juxtaposition that highlights the friction between new technologies and older regulatory 
frameworks, see Rep. George W. Gekas & James W. Harper, Annual Regulation of Business 
Focus: Regulation of Electronic Commerce, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 769, 772, 777 (1999) (juxtaposing 
the heading “The Internet: Everything’s New!” with the heading “Government: Everything’s 
Old!”). For the FDA’s early experience adapting its longstanding framework for regulating 
pharmaceutical labeling and advertising to new online promotional practices, see Peter S. 
Reichertz, Legal Issues Concerning the Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products on the Internet to 
Consumers, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 355, 357–61 (1996); Marc J. Scheineson, Legal Overview of 
Likely FDA Regulation of Internet Promotion, 51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 697 (1996). 
 2. See Joseph L. Bower & Clayton M. Christensen, Disruptive Technologies: Catching the 
Wave, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1995, at 43, 45 (1995). Bower and Christensen did not 
discuss the term “disruptive innovation” in their 1995 article, but Christensen’s follow-up 
book, CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997), helped introduce and popularize the 
term.  
 3. For example, Christensen and colleagues have applied disruption theory to health 
care. See generally CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., THE INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION: A 
DISRUPTIVE SOLUTION FOR HEALTH CARE (2009). An early application of disruption theory 
to health care in the legal literature is Lesley H. Curtis & Kevin A. Schulman, Overregulation of 
Health Care: Musings on Disruptive Innovation Theory, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2006). For 
a thoughtful analysis of why health information technologies have yet to disrupt the U.S. 
health care system, per Christensen’s criteria, see Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology’s 
Failure to Disrupt Healthcare, 13 NEV. L.J. 722 (2013). For a skeptical review of The Innovator’s 
Prescription, see J.D. Klienke, Perfection in PowerPoint, 28 HEALTH AFF. 1223 (2009) (“Although 
the book excavates several fascinating nuggets about wrenching changes in other industries, 
it attempts to force each into Christensen’s franchise-in-progress, ‘disruption theory.’ ”).  
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procedure,4 environmental law,5 and intellectual property.6 Health law 
scholarship predominates the legal literature on disruptive innovation,7 
perhaps because our dysfunctional health care system begs for 
transformation.8 And, to be sure, there is no shortage of legal scholarship 
examining technological innovation more generally.9 But no one has yet 
applied disruption theory to the field in which it should be most useful—
administrative law. Administrative law scholarship contains a rich, sprawling 
discourse on how agencies should regulate new markets.10 These questions, 
incidentally, can be particularly vexing with categorically novel technologies 
and business practices. Contemporary debates in administrative law thus map 
well onto disruption theory, and for that reason it is worth merging the two 
here. 
The one scholar that comes closest to merging disruption theory and 
administrative law theory is Tim Wu, in his recent essay Agency Threats.11 Wu 
 
 4. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook Disruption: How Social Media May 
Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75 (2012). 
 5. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?: The Case for 
Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 53 (2010). 
 6. See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
829 (2008). 
 7. Indeed, of the forty-eight articles in the Westlaw database “Journals and Law 
Reviews” (“JLR”) that cite one or more of Clayton Christensen’s publications on “disruptive 
innovation,” roughly half of them are in the health law field (search conducted on Oct. 8, 
2013). 
 8. Terry, supra note 3.  
 9. The vast majority of this scholarship focuses on intellectual property, for obvious 
reasons. But some does not. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of 
Technology, Organizational Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885 (2010). 
 10. The scholarship is too numerous to cite, but see, for example, Peter Huber, The 
Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983) (considering flaws in how 
Congress and federal regulators consider older, well-known risks versus newer, unkown 
ones); Gregory N. Mandel, History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and Technology, 8 MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 551 (2007) (deriving various lessons for policymakers after considering 
past responses to new technologies); Thomas O. McGarity & Karl O. Bayer, Federal 
Regulation of Emerging Genetic Technologies, 36 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1983) (considering whether 
then-existing regulatory frameworks were adequate to regulate new genetic engineering 
technologies); Monroe E. Price, The Newness of New Technology, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885 
(2001) (examining how legal institutions address “the threat of the new,” focusing mostly on 
information technologies). 
 11. Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841 (2011). Daniel Gervais also tackles the 
question of regulating what he calls “inchoate technologies,” distinguishing these from more 
“stable” technologies. Daniel Gervais, The Regulation of Inchoate Technologies, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 
665, 671 (2010). Like Wu, his treatment is somewhat Internet-centric. Gervais argues for a 
general skepticism towards regulating inchoate technologies, and is less concerned with the 
timing and form of intervention. As such, Gervais seems primarily concerned with whether to 
regulate inchoate technologies, not how. Id. at 669. After these, the next closest to discussing 
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does not invoke disruption theory per se, but does address how regulators 
should confront novel technologies, business models, and practices.12 In 
doing so, Wu engages a broader scholarly debate on the proper form of 
agency policymaking.13 He argues that agencies should forgo traditional 
policymaking tools like rulemaking and adjudication in favor of informal 
“threats”—packaged in guidance documents, warning letters, and the like—
when confronting industries that face conditions of rapid change and high 
uncertainty.14 An informal, elastic “threat regime” is preferable, he argues, 
when agencies face dynamic rather than static industries characterized by 
disruptive innovation, unexpected market entries, new business models, and 
other exogenous shocks.15 More traditional regulatory interventions like 
rulemaking and adjudication, the argument goes, risk being badly 
miscalibrated, or premature, or both.16 
This Article tests the argument for agency threats and offers some 
important limitations. It argues that a regulatory threat works best as a 
temporary stopgap that presages more traditional regulatory intervention, not 
as a long-term strategy. Otherwise, the threat risks becoming stale or even 
counterproductive. Resource-strapped agencies that employ threats (most 
do) should guard carefully against relying on them as a long-term crutch. At 
some point, regulators must regulate. 
In short, this Article demonstrates that agencies need not be so timid 
when confronting new technologies—even disruptive ones. If agencies are 
concerned about imposing regulation that is miscalibrated or premature, then 
they can reduce the cost of errors by using timing rules, alternative 
enforcement mechanisms, and other variations that might “soften” 
traditional regulation without undermining it long-term. In essence, 
regulators can experiment with binding approaches that can be more finely 
calibrated to the novel technology or business practice. The public interest 
demands that agencies maintain their fortitude in the face of regulatory 
disruption. And, somewhat counterintuitively, new technologies can benefit 
 
disruptive technologies and regulatory responses is Donald Labriola, Dissonant Paradigms and 
Unintended Consequences: Can (and Should) the Law Save Us from Technology?, 16 RICH. J.L. & 
TECH. 1 (2009), although the article focuses on behavioral and social psychology rather than 
regulatory theory. 
 12. Wu uses the phrase “disruptive innovation” just once in Agency Threats, supra note 
11, at 1848, and does not cite Christensen’s work. However, he has cited it in previous 
writing. E.g., TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION 
EMPIRES 20 (2010).  
 13. See also infra Section IV.B. 
 14. Wu, supra note 11, at 1842. 
 15. Id. at 1848–49. 
 16. Id. at 1849. 
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from decisive, well-timed regulation. Some early regulatory interventions 
might even become, in Daniel Carpenter’s words, “market-constituting,” by 
enabling a robust market that otherwise might not exist, especially for 
credence goods that are difficult for consumers to evaluate.17 
To make these points, this Article evaluates how a traditional regulatory 
agency, the FDA, has struggled to confront a technology that constantly 
evolves and reinvents itself—software. The FDA, responsible for regulating 
most new medical products, has spent the last century navigating waves of 
innovation in the food, drug, and medical device industries.18 Indeed, one of 
the agency’s major charges is to act as a gatekeeper for new medical 
products.19 
But computerized medical devices have confounded the agency over the 
last twenty-five years, pushing the FDA far beyond its regulatory comfort 
zone. The FDA first confronted computerized medical devices in the mid-
1980s, particularly after a series of patient deaths traced to the first radiation 
machines controlled by software.20 Following these deaths, the FDA 
published a 1987 draft guidance that explained what types of software the 
agency would and would not regulate, including the requirements that might 
apply.21 But the FDA relied on the draft guidance for the next eighteen years, 
withdrawing the policy unceremoniously in 2005,22 leaving nothing in its 
 
 17. Daniel Carpenter, Confidence Games: How Does Regulation Constitute Markets?, in 
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 164, 170 
(Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010). As Carpenter explains: 
[D]rugs are types of credence goods, whose quality consumers can assess 
neither through inspection (as for “inspection goods” like a tomato) nor 
experience (as for experience goods like a job). Such goods, social 
scientists have demonstrated both theoretically and empirically, create 
“lemons problems.” Because of informational shortcomings, consumers 
will continually purchase or consume inferior products when superior 
alternatives are available . . . . 
Id. at 174.  
 18. See FOOD & DRUG LAW INST., FDA: A CENTURY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
(Wayne L. Pines ed., 2006) (discussing various historical accounts of the FDA’s response to 
developments in the food, drug, device, and biologics industries). 
 19. See generally DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL 
IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010) (detailing an account of 
the FDA’s gatekeeping role in pharmaceutical regulation). 
 20. For a fuller account of this incident, see infra Section III.B. 
 21. Draft Policy Guidance for Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,104 
(Sept. 25, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Notice of Draft Policy]; FDA Draft Policy for the 
Regulation of Computer Products (proposed Nov. 13, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Draft 
Software Policy] (on file with author). 
 22. Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug 
Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 824,890 (Jan. 5, 2005). 
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place. The FDA never promulgated comprehensive software regulations and 
never even finalized the draft policy. All of this happened during a profound 
computer revolution no less, when software became increasingly ubiquitous 
and critical to patient safety. Today, the FDA repeats this pattern, releasing 
guidance after guidance to address software technologies in medicine.23  
The FDA’s approach to software over the last quarter century fits the 
agency threat framework strikingly well. The software industry has always 
been dynamic, not static. Many observers believe that recent software 
innovations will disrupt prevailing health industry norms and practices.24 The 
FDA faces conditions of high uncertainty, to risk understatement. And the 
conventional wisdom has been that decisive software regulation by the 
agency would be premature.25 So the FDA has relied on guidance documents 
to explain its expectations. It has not made rules. It has made threats. 
But looking back, the threats embodied in the FDA’s 1987 draft guidance 
were largely empty. The FDA’s tentative, short-term approach to an 
emerging technology calcified into a long-term default, ultimately leading to 
suboptimal regulation for an entire industry. What started as a modest, 
flexible response by the FDA, consistent with the agency threat framework, 
became stale, ultimately undermining the agency’s long-term authority over 
device software. This Article thus uses the FDA’s approach to software, 
spanning a quarter century, to argue that agency threats are only useful as a 
short-term stopgap that presages more decisive intervention. 
This Article then counterposes this example to the FCC’s approach to 
the Internet. The FCC used threats to enforce principles of Internet 
neutrality against Internet service providers as an initial, short-term precursor 
to more decisive rules and enforcement. In contrast, the FDA’s initial threats 
became a long-term crutch with no hard law backstop. These two 
approaches might be superimposed onto other examples, from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (“FAA”) screening novel aircraft designs or flight 
software, to the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) considering new 
sources of pollution or anti-emissions technologies, to the Securities and 
 
 23. For example, in September 2013, the FDA published another guidance explaining 
its approach to the latest generation of device software, embodied in mobile medical 
applications for smartphones and tablets (called “medical apps” or more broadly, “mobile 
health” applications). FDA, Mobile Medical Applications (Sept. 25, 2013) [hereinafter 
Mobile Medical Applications], available at http://‌www.fda.gov/downloads/ 
medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm263366.pdf. 
 24. See, e.g., CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 3; WILLIAM HANSON, SMART MEDICINE: 
HOW THE CHANGING ROLE OF DOCTORS WILL REVOLUTIONIZE HEALTH CARE 3–16 
(2011) (describing uses of software technology in modern medicine). 
 25. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.  
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) engaging novel securities instruments or 
high-speed trading technologies. The FDA’s own experience in relying 
primarily on guidance to confront novel things like genetically modified 
foods, nanotechnology, and xenotransplantation, demonstrates both the 
patterns and the stakes here.26 Somewhat counterintuitively, both the public 
and the innovators can benefit from earlier, more decisive regulatory 
interventions, per the FCC’s approach to net neutrality. 
The Article begins in Part II by addressing “regulatory disruption,” the 
idea that novel technologies or business practices can disturb existing 
regulatory frameworks. Part III then considers agency threats as a response, 
drawing on the FDA’s long struggle to regulate computerized devices as a 
model to avoid, and the FCC’s recent battle for net neutrality as the model to 
emulate. Part IV broadens this argument and assesses normatively how 
agencies should address regulatory disruption. Agencies facing disruption 
must make four related decisions, each of which is implicated when deciding 
whether to use “threats”: (i) when to intervene, (ii) the form that intervention 
should take, (iii) how durable or transitory that intervention should be, and 
(iv) how rigorously to monitor and sanction noncompliance. “Threats” are 
not just a decision about form, but also represent decisions about timing, 
duration, and enforcement. 
This Article argues that if agencies are concerned about regulating new 
technologies or business practices in error, or prematurely, then they can 
experiment with alternative timing and enforcement methods to reduce these 
risks while maintaining regulatory fortitude. Agencies can experiment with 
binding regulation. For example, agencies might use regulatory sunsets to 
better calibrate how long the intervention endures. Agencies could also 
specify rulemaking deadlines to make good on initial threats. And citizen 
suits or private rights of action could help correct systematic 
underenforcement by resource-strapped regulators. 
II. DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
In 1995, Joseph Bower and Clayton Christensen introduced the idea of 
“disruptive technologies” that depart fundamentally from existing ones, 
usually by being less complicated, more accessible, and less expensive.27 
Disruptive “technologies”—later broadened in the literature to disruptive 
 
 26. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm 
Become Benign Neglect?, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH., no 4, Spring 2006, at 1, 22–35, 45, 60–63. 
 27. Bower & Christensen, supra note 2. 
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“innovations”—undermine and then displace incumbents.28 Classic examples 
include the Kodak camera, Bell telephones, Sony transistor radios, the Ford 
Model T, and Xerox photocopiers.29 Contemporary examples include Cisco 
routers, Fidelity mutual funds, Google advertising, and the Southwest 
Airlines business model.30 In each case, the market entrant introduced an 
innovation that eventually, though often not immediately, changed the entire 
market. The innovation “disrupts” the market in unforeseen ways. 
This Article merges disruption theory with theories of regulation, using 
the idea of disruptive innovation to consider how regulators should respond 
to novel technologies or business practices that do not fit comfortably within 
their regulatory frameworks. The innovation typically falls within a specific 
agency’s jurisdiction, but does not fit well within the agency’s regulatory 
schemes that contemplate more established technologies or business 
practices. The innovation “disrupts” the regulatory framework, not 
necessarily industry incumbents, as envisioned by Bower and Christensen. 
“Regulatory disruption” occurs, then, when the “disruptee” is the regulatory 
framework itself.31 
Certainly, there have been iconic innovations that did not fall within an 
existing agency’s jurisdiction, eventually prompting Congress to create 
entirely new agencies. For example, the birth of commercial aviation during 
the barnstorming 1920s coincided with the birth of the Bureau of Air 
Commerce, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, and other precursors to the 
modern Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”).32 The parallel evolutions 
of the automobile industry and the U.S. interstate highway system led 
Congress to create the National Highway Safety Agency, the precursor to the 
 
 28. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 2, at XV. 
 29. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 7. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Daniel Gervais addresses his analysis to “inchoate” technologies, which are 
fledgling technologies that have yet to mature. He does not focus his analysis explicitly on 
“disruptive” innovations, although he also seems to contemplate technologies that do not fit 
well into existing regulatory frameworks. See Gervais, supra note 11, at 671–72. 
 32. See generally Miranda Anger, International Aviation Safety: An Examination of the U.S., 
EU, and the Developing World, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 141, 142–49 (2007); Frederick A. Ballard, 
Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1235 (1947). For a fascinating history of the 
government’s unique role in innovation in the commercial airline industry, see David C. 
Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, The Commercial Aircraft Industry, in GOVERNMENT AND 
TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 101–61 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 
1982). 
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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), and the 
Department of Transportation.33 
But this Article is not concerned with innovations that have no 
regulatory “home,” as these generally require congressional intervention to 
assign jurisdiction. Agencies cannot address them sua sponte.34 The U.S. 
regulatory state has aged out of its formative years, when Congress created 
most modern regulatory agencies.35 Today, there are hundreds of federal 
agencies, departments, and commissions,36 many of which enjoy sweeping 
jurisdiction. For that reason, few innovations today will emerge without a 
regulatory “home” (or even multiple “homes”) completely beyond every 
agency’s jurisdiction. The contemporary challenge, then, is how existing 
agencies can confront these innovations given their broad but sometimes 
inert statutory frameworks. 
 
 33. Ralph Nader’s famous book, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN 
DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965), amplified growing public demand for 
auto safety regulation, leading Congress to pass the Highway Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 
89–564, 80 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. §§ 401–404 (2012)), the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–563, 80 Stat. 718 (codified as 
amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30,101–30,126, 30,141–30,147, 30,161–30,169 (2012)), and the 
Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966). In parallel, 
Congress confronted pollution by motor vehicles with the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution 
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 87-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), which vested regulatory authority with 
the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”). In 1969, Congress 
created the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) with the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321–4347), which was later reorganized by executive order into the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966–1970), 
reprinted in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). For a history of the government’s role in facilitating 
innovation in the automobile industry, see Lawrence J. White, The Motor Vehicle Industry, in 
GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 
411–50. 
 34. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (striking 
down the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products without explicit congressional 
authority to do so). 
 35. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded 
Age, 119 YALE L.J. 1362 (2010) (describing an early history of administrative agencies); Jerry 
L. Mashaw, Administration and “the Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829–
1861, 117 YALE L.J. 1568 (2008); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration 
and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636 (2007); Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE 
L.J. 1256 (2006); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1189 (1986) (describing a broader period-by-period history of federal regulation). 
 36. See Federal Agencies and Commissions, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.white 
house.gov/our-government/federal-agencies-and-commissions (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).  
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Perhaps the best modern example is the Internet. Since 1934, the FCC 
has had jurisdiction over communications networks.37 But the 
Communications Act addressed a world of circuit-switching on telephone 
lines operated by monopoly “common carriers,” not the future world of 
decentralized, digitized, packet-switching run by a constellation of smaller 
Internet service providers.38 When this world began to emerge in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the FCC “self-consciously adopted a policy of non-regulation.”39 
But the FCC’s posture of separating “telecommunications services” from 
“information services” became less and less tenable as the Internet began to 
mature in the 1990s.40 By then, it was clear that Internet service fell within 
the FCC’s jurisdiction. But it did not square well with the FCC’s longstanding 
framework.41 
Another immediate example of disruptive innovation is the avalanche of 
novel securities instruments that contributed to the 2008 financial crisis. For 
years, financial firms had been experimenting with new and sometimes exotic 
securities products, particularly over-the-counter derivatives like mortgage-
backed securities, credit default swaps, and collateralized debt obligations.42 
In the 1990s, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) 
considered using its existing jurisdiction to regulate the derivatives market, 
until Congress intervened to bar it, at the behest of key regulators like 
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Robert 
 
 37. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2012)) (“An Act to provide for the regulation of 
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio, and for other purposes.”). 
 38. See Jonathan Weinberg, The Internet and “Telecommunications Services,” Universal Service 
Mechanisms, Access Charges, and Other Flotsam of the Regulatory System, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 211, 
211–12, 215–18 (1999) (juxtaposing Internet technologies with the regulatory framework 
created by the Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC). 
 39. Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 UC DAVIS L. REV. 529, 531 
(2009) (internal quotations omitted). 
 40. See Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1763–64 (2011); see also 
Weinberg, supra note 38, at 212, 232–34; Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, supra note 39, 
at 531. 
 41. See infra Section III.C (discussing the FCC’s response in further detail). 
 42. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT, at xxiv (2011), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-
reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf [hereinafter FCIC FINAL REPORT] (reviewing financial 
products and their contribution to the financial collapse of 2008); see also Brooksley Born, 
Foreword: Deregulation: A Major Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 231 
(2011). For an entertaining popular account of these novel securities and those who created 
them (and the few that actually understood them), see MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: 
INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010). 
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Rubin.43 Greenspan, a well-known laissez faire economist, pushed 
deregulation and self-regulation in the derivatives market, strongly resisting 
the CFTC’s efforts to act on concerns that the market posed broad, systemic 
risks.44 In the years leading up to the housing and stock market crash in 2008, 
the derivatives market would balloon to $673 trillion in notional amount.45 
In the wake of the economic crisis, Congress created the Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”) to investigate the root causes of the financial 
collapse.46 The FCIC attributed the collapse in part to the weak response by 
regulators to these novel financial products and practices. For example, the 
Federal Reserve Board had refused to use its authority to regulate aggressive 
new mortgage lending practices.47 The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) had failed to enforce disclosure requirements for mortgage-backed 
securities.48 Congress had pushed to deregulate novel over-the-counter 
derivatives.49 And regulators like the SEC, the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (“OCC”), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) 
exerted only superficial oversight of the banks engaged in these activities.50 
The FCIC’s final report found that “[t]echnology has transformed the 
efficiency, speed, and complexity of financial instruments and transactions,” 
but that the United States “had a 21st-century financial system with 19th-
century safeguards.”51 
 
 43. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 
2763 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, 15 U.S.C.). Before that, 
Congress imposed a moratorium on the CFTC action. Omnibus Consolidated and 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277 § 760, 112 Stat. 2681-1, 
2681-35 (1998). For a description of the role Rubin and Greenspan, among others, played in 
this matter, see FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 47. The over-the-counter derivatives 
market is one innovation that Wu concedes might have benefited from more traditional early 
regulation. Wu, supra note 11, at 1850. 
 44. Peter S. Goodman, Taking a Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/economy/09greenspan.html (quoting 
congressional testimony of Brooksley Born, then chair of the CFTC, that the opaque 
derivatives market could “threaten our regulated markets or, indeed, our economy without 
any federal agency knowing about it.”); Born, supra note 42, at 236–38 (quoting Greenspan’s 
testimony to Congress urging that regulation was unnecessary for over-the-counter 
derivatives). 
 45. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xxiv. 
 46. Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21 § 5(a), 123 Stat. 
1617, 1625. 
 47. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xvii; Born, supra note 42, at 234–35. 
 48. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 169–70; Born, supra note 42, at 235–36. 
 49. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xxiv–xxv; Born, supra note 42, at 236–38. 
 50. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xviii, 150–54, 173–174, 302–04; Born, supra 
note 42, at 238–42.  
 51. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 42, at xv, xvii, xx. 
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These stories tell the modern predicament: how do regulators with broad 
statutory authority manage innovations as they mature, and as their problems 
become apparent? 
III. EMPTY THREATS? 
If certain innovations do not square well with existing regulatory 
frameworks, how should agencies respond, sans congressional intervention? 
This Part first considers the argument that agencies should rely on informal 
threats rather than more traditional modes of regulation. It then 
demonstrates how the FDA took precisely this approach with computerized 
devices twenty-five years ago, which led to suboptimal regulation of 
increasingly ubiquitous and dangerous products. This story cautions against 
over-relying on regulatory threats. Part III concludes by counterposing the 
FDA’s approach to software with the FCC’s use of threats to address 
Internet networks, which was disciplined by early enforcement and 
rulemaking to codify its threats. Unlike the FDA, the FCC did not over-rely 
on threats. 
A. AGENCY THREATS 
The agency threat framework argues that federal agencies should use 
informal “threats” against regulated industries under conditions of “high 
uncertainty.”52 For example, an agency might announce via guidance 
document, warning letter, or press release that it will take action against 
companies that employ novel technologies or business practices in a certain 
way.53 But this type of regulatory elasticity, as demonstrated below, can 
harden into a long-term default position, leading to suboptimal regulation if 
not disciplined in some way. 
An agency makes a “threat” when it gives “at least some warning of 
agency action related to either ongoing or planned behavior.”54 Agencies can 
package threats in many forms—guidance documents, interpretive rules, 
warning letters, press releases, official speeches, and even private meetings 
with regulated firms.55 Threats can be very public, as a press release, or very 
 
 52. Wu, supra note 11, at 1848 (defining “high uncertainty” as scenarios “in which 
alternative future states of the world do not occur with quantifiable probability”). 
 53. Id. at 1841, 1844. 
 54. Id. at 1844. 
 55. Id. Some of these vehicles themselves come in many forms. For example, guidance 
documents can include enforcement guidelines, policy statements, interpretive rules and 
memoranda, agency staff manuals and circulars, private ruling letters, informal advice, etc. 
See Final Bulletin, Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan. 25, 2007); 
M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386, 1391 
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private, as a face-to-face meeting.56 Either way, the threat specifies behavior 
that the agency either desires or forbids.57 Invoking a notorious example, Wu 
gives a nod to Don Corleone’s use of threats in The Godfather.58 
Regardless of their wrapping, threats are informal rather than formal, soft 
law rather than binding hard law, and are issued without much procedure 
(though they may be accompanied by quite a bit of ceremony).59 This, indeed, 
is their appeal. Threats can issue without notice and comment or other 
procedural hurdles required by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or 
other statutes.60 As such, threats serve as a third alternative to rulemaking and 
adjudication, the two classic modes of regulation.61 According to Wu, Peter 
Strauss, and other advocates of informal agency action, threats occupy “an 
important element in the hierarchy of agency law.”62 On this I agree. 
Wu also contemplates threats as being unenforceable by agencies,63 
though ambiguity on this point seems to be the point. Otherwise, what is the 
agency threatening? The agency threat specifies either desired or forbidden 
behavior, and at least hints at potential repercussions. Threats, in short, are 
assertions that the agency will do something at some point given certain 
triggering activities. A threat that is unenforceable on its face would not seem 
to appeal to many agencies. 
 
(2004). A 2007 Executive Order by the Bush administration defined “guidance document” 
as “an agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory 
action, that sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an 
interpretation of a statutory or regulatory issue.” See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191–
92 (2007) (rescinded by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010)). 
 56. Wu, supra note 11, at 1844. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Wu stops short of suggesting that agencies rely on some of the more aggressive 
tactics used by the mafia. See id. at 1857 (referencing THE GODFATHER (Paramount Pictures 
1972)). 
 59. Id. at 1844. “Soft law” is described in Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: 
Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008). 
 60. See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and 
the LikeShould Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1328, 1334–
35 (1992); Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011 
BYU L. REV. 1371, 1380 (2011); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of 
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 874–76 (1997); Lars Noah, The 
Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 901, 904–05 (2008). 
 61. Wu, supra note 11, at 1841. 
 62. Gersen & Posner, supra note 59, at 626; Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the 
Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 
804 (2001); Wu, supra note 11, at 1847; David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 
294 (2006). 
 63. See Wu, supra note 11, at 1846.  
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Threats are useful, according to their proponents, under conditions of 
high uncertainty, and for dynamic rather than static states of industry.64 Thus, 
for relatively stable industries in which business models, practices, and 
technologies are relatively well settled, agencies have enough information to 
regulate with certainty.65 Legally binding rules make sense. Agencies can 
activate the lumbering machinery of rulemaking or adjudication without 
worrying that the effort will be for naught, or that “law” they produce will 
soon be obsolete. But in dynamic industries—characterized by disruptive 
innovation, unexpected market entries, new business models, and other 
exogenous shocks—agencies may lack sufficient information to regulate with 
certainty.66 Doing so risks creating rules that are miscalibrated, or premature, 
or both.67 
According to the threat framework, agencies face three choices when 
confronting dynamic states of industry: make law, make threats, or do 
nothing.68 Again, making law via traditional rulemaking or adjudication can 
be premature or simply may generate flawed rules. And somewhat ironically, 
making law may create more uncertainty by triggering judicial challenges that 
can take years to resolve.69 Doing nothing, or waiting, can also be undesirable 
because the industry may develop outside the public eye, and without 
considering the public interest.70 Moreover, as the industry matures, the more 
settled its norms and business practices will become, which can be hard to 
reverse later.71 
Threats, the argument goes, allow agencies to oversee the formative years 
of an industry without suffocating it.72 Agency threats themselves can 
 
 64. Id. at 1848. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1849. 
 67. Id. Although Wu does not discuss Clayton Christensen’s “disruptive innovation” 
framework in Agency Threats, supra note 11, he does address it in a separate work. See WU, 
THE MASTER SWITCH, supra note 12, at 20. 
 68. Wu, supra note 11, at 1848–49. This list generally parallels the four choices David 
Super identifies when agencies must make decisions that appear to be unusually costly: (i) 
devote the resources necessary to make the decision, (ii) make a low-quality decision based 
on the limited decisional inputs it can muster, (iii) postpone a decision to when it has better 
decisional inputs, or (iv) do nothing. David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
1375, 1407 (2011). 
 69. Wu, supra note 11, at 1849. 
 70. Id. at 1850. Gervais, conversely, argues that social norms and sometimes the 
technology itself will fill the regulatory void. Gervais, supra note 11, at 668. 
 71. Wu, supra note 11, at 1842, 1854. 
 72. Id. at 1851. 
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generate a public debate, which often contemplates the public interest.73 And 
the lack of formality makes the threat quicker to issue and more flexible than 
rulemaking or adjudication.74 If the threat turns out to be too harsh, or not 
harsh enough, the agency can easily retreat or recalibrate. 
Proponents argue that the criticisms of agency threats are overblown. 
Rather than being a procedural end-run around the APA, an amplification of 
statutory authority, a way to skirt judicial review, or even an affront to the 
rule of law itself,75 agency threats are precisely what agencies should use in 
conditions of high uncertainty. According to Wu, we should stop worrying 
and learn to love agency threats.76 
This Article tests this argument by looking at two instances of agencies 
relying on threats in responding to disruptive technologies: the FDA’s 
response to software and the FCC’s response to the Internet. It is striking 
how closely the FDA’s approach to software fits the threat framework. The 
medical device software industry has always been relatively dynamic.77 The 
pace of innovation seems to be forever quickening, not abating, as evidenced 
by the latest generation of medical software for mobile devices.78 To say that 
the FDA is facing conditions of high uncertainty is to risk understatement.79 
Moreover, frequently we hear the chorus that FDA rulemaking for software 
would be premature, due to the agency’s lack of expertise, its lack of 
resources, and the state of the industry.80 
 
 73. Id. Gervais worries that quickly-developing social norms will evolve to circumvent 
any new regulatory framework. Gervais, supra note 11, at 673. 
 74. Wu, supra note 11, at 1851. 
 75. Id. at 1846–47. Wu focuses particular attention on Lars Noah’s criticisms, supra 
note 60, which survey the range of problems and recent examples of abuse. 
 76. Wu, supra note 11, at 1842; see also Nicolas P. Terry, Prescriptions Sans Frontières (or 
How I Stopped Worrying About Viagra on the Web but Grew Concerned About the Future of Healthcare 
Delivery), 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 183 (2004); DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I 
LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964). 
 77. Nathan Cortez, Analog Agency in a Digital World (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author) (tracing the development of early medical device software to the present 
day, and the FDA’s regulatory response).  
 78. See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1173 
(2014) (surveying mobile medical applications and other mobile health technologies and 
examining their significance). 
 79. The FDA itself emphasizes the high uncertainty in its guidance for mobile medical 
applications, noting the “extensive variety of actual and potential functions of mobile apps, 
the rapid pace of innovation in mobile apps, and the potential benefits and risks to public 
health represented by these apps.” Mobile Medical Applications, supra note 23, at 4. 
 80. See, e.g., FDA Public Workshop-Mobile Medical Applications Draft Guidance, FDA, (Sept. 
12–13, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/ 
ucm267821.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) [hereinafter FDA Public Workshop] (transcripts 
available at http://‌www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/uc 
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Consistent with the agency threat framework, the FDA did not make law. 
Nor did it do nothing. It published several guidance documents. It made 
threats. Moreover, these threats have at times generated public debate, 
sometimes even including lengthy public comment periods.81 Finally, the 
latest wave of medical software developers seems to prefer some guidance to 
none,82 although unsurprisingly it wants more clarity. In short, the FDA’s 
approach to software over the last twenty-five years demonstrates how an 
agency relied on threats in precisely the circumstances described by Wu. 
B. THE FDA AND THE QUARTER-CENTURY-LONG THREAT 
Overburdened agencies like the FDA have long embraced informal 
threats. But there can be too much of a good thing. For twenty-five years, the 
FDA has relied on threats to address software in medical devices. This 
history cautions that threats can become stale and even counterproductive. 
As with many regulatory interventions, the FDA’s foray into device 
software was prompted by tragedy.83 The story begins in 1985, when a 
Canadian company began selling the first therapeutic radiation machines 
controlled primarily by software.84 Between 1985 and 1987, the machines 
massively over-radiated several patients in the United States and Canada, 
killing at least six.85 The injuries were attributed to various software design 
flaws and user errors.86 When the FDA investigated these incidents, it 
required the manufacturer to make certain corrections, which were not fully 
 
m275908.htm and http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConfere 
nces/ucm275909.htm). 
 81. Id. 
 82. The mHealth Regulatory Coalition objected to the Bennett-Hatch amendment to 
the FDA user fee bill that would have prohibited FDA from finalizing its Draft Guidance 
for eighteen months. Letter from mHealth Regulatory Coalition to Senators Enzi and 
Harkin (May 17, 2012), http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/ 
06/MRC-Letter-to-Senate-HELP-Committee-on-Proposed-Moratorium-FINAL.pdf.  
 83. The tragedy over thalidomide helped prompt the 1962 Drug Amendments. 
CARPENTER, supra note 19, at 256–60; J. Richard Crout et al., FDA’s Role in the Pathway to Safe 
and Effective Drugs, in FDA: A CENTURY OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 18, at 159, 
168–69. 
 84. See generally Nancy G. Leveson, Medical Devices: The Therac-25, in SAFEWARE: SYSTEM 
SAFETY AND COMPUTERS 515 app. A (1995) (providing a comprehensive story of the 
Therac-25 saga). The FDA had begun considering software before the Therac-25, as shown 
by its letters in response to congressional committees considering computers in medicine. See 
Information Technologies in the Health Care System, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Investigations and 
Oversight of the H. Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 99th Cong. 196–204 (1986). But the Therac-25 saga 
seemed to push the agency towards announcing a policy towards software. 
 85. Leveson, supra note 84, at 515. 
 86. Id. 
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implemented until two years later, after a recall.87 Yet, at the time, the FDA’s 
response was considered “impressive,” given that it had no policy for 
medical software.88 
In 1986, FDA Commissioner Frank Young said in a speech that the 
agency would approach device software with the “least regulation consistent 
with the requirements of public health and safety.”89 This speech represented 
the first threat, though the threat was a soft, imprecise one. In 1987, the 
FDA published its first draft policy on software, explaining which types of 
software the agency would and would not regulate, and which regulatory 
requirements might apply.90 
In 1989, the FDA updated the document, which became known as the 
“Draft Software Policy.”91 The policy confirmed that the FDA’s “basic 
philosophy for computer products” was “to apply the least degree of 
regulatory control necessary to provide reasonable assurance of safety and 
effectiveness.”92 Like the 1987 version, the 1989 policy delineated which 
computer products the agency would and would not regulate.93 It clarified 
how these new technologies might fit into the statutory definition of 
“device,” which Congress wrote in 1976 when no one could have imagined 
today’s versions.94 Together, the 1987 and 1989 draft software policies 
constituted “threats,” consistent with the framework. 
Since that time, the FDA’s approach to computerized medical devices 
has been the archetype of regulatory minimalism. The agency never finalized 
the 1989 Draft Software Policy; in fact, the FDA withdrew it without 
explanation in 2005.95 In the absence of legally binding rules, lawyers have 
 
 87. Id. at 525, 544–48. 
 88. Id. at 553. 
 89. FDA & National Library of Medicine, Software Policy Workshop (Sept. 3–4, 
1996), reprinted in FOOD AND DRUG LAW INSTITUTE, BIOMEDICAL SOFTWARE REGULATION 
403 (Thomas E. Colonna & Jonathan S. Helfgott eds., 2009) [hereinafter FDA & NLM, 
1996 Software Policy Workshop]. 
 90. 1987 Notice of Draft Policy, supra note 21; see also Medical Devices; Medical 
Software Devices; Notice of Public Workshop, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,886 (July 15, 1996). The 
FDA had begun crafting the policy in 1985. See FDA & NLM, 1996 Software Policy 
Workshop, supra note 89, at 403. 
 91. 1989 Draft Software Policy, supra note 21; see Mobile Medical Applications, supra 
note 23, at 6. 
 92. E. Stewart Crumpler & Harvey Rudolph, FDA Software Policy and Regulation of 
Medical Device Software, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 511, 513 (1997). 
 93. 1989 FDA Draft Software Policy, supra note 21. 
 94. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (2012)). 
 95. Annual Comprehensive List of Guidance Documents at the Food and Drug 
Administration, 70 Fed. Reg. 824,890 (Jan. 5, 2005). 
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had to advise clients based largely on the 1989 draft policy, even after the 
FDA withdrew the policy. The agency did pre-clear discrete software 
products on a case-by-case basis, which could serve as precedent for similar 
products.96 But this piecemeal approach fell far short of establishing a 
definitive, cohesive philosophy towards software that companies could use to 
predict their regulatory obligations. 
Ironically, after the FDA withdrew the 1989 guidance, it explained that 
“it would be impractical to prepare an overarching software policy to address 
all of the issues related to the regulation of all medical devices containing 
software” because “the use of computer and software products as medical 
devices grew exponentially and the types of products diversified and became 
more complex.”97 Thus, rather than providing more oversight as medical 
technology matured—during a profound computer revolution—the FDA 
provided less. 
By and large, the FDA has avoided proceeding by rule here. It has 
promulgated very few prospective regulations governing software, and what 
little it has done addresses relatively low-risk devices.98 For example, in 2011, 
the FDA finalized a rule governing medical device data systems. But these 
represent only a narrow slice of low-risk products that merely transfer, store, 
display, or convert medical device data, without doing much else.99 
Periodically, in the preambles to final rules, the FDA will acknowledge 
computer products. For example, when finalizing its Quality Systems 
Regulation (“QSR”) for devices in 1996, the FDA observed that software 
design flaws and the failure to validate software after maintenance were the 
most common source of errors.100 The QSR, which establishes good 
manufacturing practices for devices,101 has been perhaps the one area in 
 
 96. For example, the FDA has created dozens of regulatory categories for devices that 
incorporate software, including medical calculators, cameras, lights, magnifiers, microscopes, 
monitors, recorders, reminders, scales, surgical tools, and a host of data systems that store, 
display, and manipulate data. Mobile Medical Applications, supra note 23, at 29–31 (listing 
distinct device categories codified by FDA). 
 97. FDA, Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff: 
Mobile Medical Applications, 5 (July 11, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Mobile Medical 
Applications Draft] (on file with author) (superseded by Mobile Medical Applications, supra 
note 23) (referring to the 2005 withdrawal of the 1989 Draft Software Policy). 
 98. For example, in 2011, the agency promulgated a rule classifying devices that 
electronically display, store, transfer, or convert medical device data, known as Medical 
Device Data Systems (“MDDS”). 76 Fed. Reg. 8637 (Feb. 15, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
§ 880.6310 (2013)). 
 99. See 21 C.F.R. § 880.6310(a); 76 Fed. Reg. 8643–44 (Feb. 15, 2011). 
 100. Medical Devices; Current Good Manufacturing Practice (“CGMP”), 61 Fed. Reg. 
52,602, 52,617, 52,620 (Oct. 7, 1996). 
 101. 21 C.F.R. § 820.1 (2013). 
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which the FDA has provided firm standards for software. But the QSR is 
notable for giving manufacturers significant flexibility to design and 
manufacture devices according to customized specifications.102 This is both a 
strength and a weakness—a strength in recognizing the diversity of medical 
devices and the implausibility of generating one-size-fits-all standards, but a 
weakness in decentralizing standards and delegating significant discretion to 
regulated firms. Of course, the FDA relies on guidance to explain how the 
QSR applies to software.103 
Indeed, the FDA heavily relies on guidance to oversee software. Agency 
documents that summarize the FDA’s approach generally cite to the same 
cluster of five guidances.104 Together, these documents form a cascade of 
quasi-regulation, recommendations, and “current thinking,”105 but offer few 
firm rules. Software does not stand on terra firma with the FDA. Looking 
back, the 1987 document was like the gateway drug that led to guidance after 
guidance for the next twenty-five years. 
Unfortunately, the FDA’s response to software has not been 
commensurate with how ubiquitous and critical to patient safety software has 
become. Widespread problems with device software persist. For example, 
between 2009 and 2011, the New York Times documented several hundred 
catastrophic injuries caused by software and user errors related to the newest 
generation of radiation machines.106 The incidents bear striking similarity to 
the problems with radiation software that originally prompted the FDA’s 
 
 102. See Medical Devices Quality System (QS) Regulation/Medical Device Good Manufacturing 
Practices, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Post 
marketRequirements/QualitySystemsRegulations/default.htm (last updated Apr. 28, 2011).  
 103. See, e.g., FDA, General Principles of Software Validation (Jan. 11, 2002), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulation 
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 104. See FDA, Cybersecurity for Networked Medical Devices Containing Off-the-Shelf 
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Medical Devices (May 11, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/medical 
devices/deviceregulationandguidance/guidancedocuments/ucm089593.pdf; FDA, General 
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Manufacturers (Mar. 11, 1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Medical 
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 105. See, e.g., FDA, supra note 103, at 1.  
 106. See, e.g., Radiation Boom, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/ 
us/series/radiation_boom/index.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (linking to twenty-six 
articles in the series on medical radiation by Walt Bogdanich).  
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intervention two decades earlier. In one case, a hospital in Manhattan 
exposed a cancer patient to fatal doses of radiation for three consecutive days 
after the software repeatedly crashed.107 The patient died two years later.108 In 
another case, a Brooklyn hospital administered three and a half times the 
prescribed dose of radiation to a breast cancer patient for twenty-seven days 
due to user errors and misprogrammed software.109 The New York Times 
documented hundreds of similar mistakes,110 with one expert estimating that 
one in twenty radiation patients nationwide will suffer injury.111 
Unfortunately, the FDA’s posture towards software is reactive rather 
than proactive. To wit, the FDA subsequently investigated these radiation 
software failures reported by the New York Times, but only after they 
generated national attention.112 
Yet, the FDA seems to be generally aware of the dangers posed by 
software products. In February 2010, the FDA revealed during a public 
meeting that it had received voluntary reports of 260 malfunctions, forty-four 
injuries, and six deaths related to health information technologies.113 But 
because these were voluntary reports, and because even the FDA’s 
mandatory reporting requirements suffer from dramatic under-reporting, the 
real numbers are no doubt much higher.114 
These injuries are the byproducts of medical innovation. As alluring as 
medical innovation is, it is not an unmitigated good. The role of regulators 
like the FDA is to facilitate the benefits of new technologies while managing 
 
 107. Walt Bogdanich, Radiation Offers New Cures, and Ways to Do Harm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/health/24radiation.html.  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (“Over the previous eight years, despite hundreds of mistakes, the state issued 
just three fines against radiotherapy centers, the largest of which was $8,000.”); Walt 
Bogdanich, As Technology Surges, Radiation Safeguards Lag, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/us/27radiation.html. 
 111. Bogdanich, supra note 107 (quoting Dr. John J. Feldmeier of the University of 
Toledo). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Testimony of Jeffrey Shuren, Director, FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological 
Health, Health Information Technology (“HIT”) Policy Committee, Adoption/Certification 
Workgroup (Feb. 25, 2010) (on file with author). 
 114. See Edward M. Basile & Beverly H. Lorell, The Food and Drug Administration’s 
Regulation of Risk Disclosure for Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators: Has Technology Outpaced the 
Agency’s Regulatory Framework?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 251, 257–58 (2006) (“The [FDA] 
estimates that as few as one in every 100 medical device adverse events actually is reported 
to [the] FDA, although there is no hard data to support this estimate.”). 
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their risks.115 Doing so should support rather than undermine long-term 
markets for the technologies, preserve consumer trust, and level the playing 
field among competitors. Facilitating new technologies need not be in 
tension with managing their risks. The challenge for regulators is pursuing 
both during early periods of high uncertainty. 
C. THE FCC AND THE SIX-YEAR-LONG THREAT 
In contrast to the FDA’s quarter-century-long threat, the FCC took a 
more disciplined approach when confronted with its own disruptive 
innovation. Unlike the FDA’s initial “threat” in 1987, which lingered for 
decades, the FCC’s initial “threat” in 2004—warning Internet service 
providers to maintain net neutrality116—was quickly reinforced by 
enforcement and, ultimately, by rulemaking just six years later. The 
differences here are instructive. Like the FDA, the FCC was confronted with 
a new technology that did not square well with its existing regulatory 
framework. And like the FDA’s early posture towards software, the FCC’s 
early posture towards the Internet was one of benign neglect.117 The lack of 
high-profile problems seemed to justify this approach,118 perhaps as it also 
justified FDA’s early stance towards software. 
The Internet developed gradually as a government and academic network 
between the late 1960s and the late 1980s.119 Since 1934, jurisdiction over 
communications networks has resided with the FCC.120 As early as 1966, the 
FCC foresaw the potential convergence between computers and 
communications, initiating what it called the Computer I inquiry to study how 
 
 115. For example, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act authorizes the FDA to 
pre-approve only new drugs that are safe and effective, which requires balancing their risks 
and benefits. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).  
 116. Wu, supra note 11, at 1844–45, 1852 n.41. Wu originally coined the phrase “net 
neutrality.” See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 141 (2003). 
 117. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, supra note 39, at 531, 533 (“To date, the 
Internet has developed outside of the FCC’s traditional regulatory model, enjoying freedom 
from regulatory oversight.”). 
 118. Id. at 537. 
 119. See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (1999) (providing a 
detailed historical account of the Internet); A Brief History of the Internet & Related Networks, 
INTERNET SOCIETY,  http://www.internetsociety.org/internet/what-internet/history-internet/ 
brief-history-internet-related-networks (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (providing a briefer 
history). For a compelling account of the government support required to develop the 
Internet and personal computing, see Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the Federal 
Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 120. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (“An Act to provide for the regulation of 
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio, and for other purposes.”). 
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computers might both operate on and replicate traditional telephone 
networks.121 As a result of the inquiry, the FCC “chose to quarantine data 
processing from regulated telecommunications, rather than tackle the public 
policy considerations of the nascent computer utility directly.”122  
During the twentieth century, federal communications law developed 
discrete regulatory regimes for discrete services, such as telephony, broadcast 
television, cable television, and satellite.123 Internet Protocol transmissions 
did not fit neatly, if at all, into these regulatory categories.124 The FCC’s 
regulatory framework, based on the hoary Communications Act of 1934, 
contemplated a world of circuit-switching on legacy telephone lines run by 
monopoly “common carriers”; it did not anticipate (how could it?) the 
decentralized, digitized, packet-switching Internet that later emerged.125 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the FCC “self-consciously adopted a policy 
of non-regulation toward the Internet during its emergence as an important 
commercial network.”126 But as the Internet began to grow exponentially in 
the mid 1990s, the FCC’s posture of separating “telecommunications 
services” from “information services” became less and less tenable.127 
Indeed, dividing the communications world by service category has become 
obsolete with computer-to-computer communications that can now replicate 
other categories of services.128 Thus, Internet service clearly fell within the 
FCC’s jurisdiction. But it did not square well with the FCC’s longstanding 
framework, based as it was on service categories. The categorical lines 
evaporated with Internet technologies. 
The FCC understandably struggled with whether to apply traditional 
regulatory frameworks to a technology as dynamic as the Internet.129 Even 
1996 legislation addressing Internet networks became outdated by the late 
 
 121. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer 
and Communications Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966); see also Bickerstaff, supra 
note 119, at 7–13 (recounting the FCC’s launch of the Computer I inquiry). 
 122. Werbach, supra note 40, at 1763. 
 123. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 213. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 215–18 (juxtaposing Internet technologies with the 
regulatory framework created by the Communications Act of 1934, which created the FCC). 
 126. Weiser, supra note 39, at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 212, 232–34; Weiser, supra note 39, at 531; Werbach, 
supra note 40, at 1764. 
 128. Weinberg, supra note 38, at 232–34. 
 129. Weiser, supra note 39, at 549–50. 
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1990s.130 Internet scholars rehashed the familiar debate about whether 
rulemaking or adjudication would be more effective.131 
Eventually, Internet technologies and business practices matured enough 
to warrant binding regulation.132 But the FCC proceeded initially by making a 
threat. In 2004, FCC Chairman Michael Powell gave a speech at a popular 
telecommunications conference, warning the broadband industry that it 
should preserve net neutrality in various ways, such as allowing broadband 
users to attach different devices to their networks and use Internet 
applications of their choice.133 
This threat turned out to be far from empty. Just one year after Powell’s 
speech, the FCC initiated an investigation against a telephone company that 
violated one of these principles.134 Of course, the FCC did not allege that the 
company violated Powell’s speech. Rather, it cited violations of the 
Communications Act of 1934.135 The FCC backed up its threat. 
Moreover, the FCC elaborated on Internet freedoms in a policy 
statement shortly after the settlement136 and promulgated a legally binding 
rule just six years later, codifying the thrust of Powell’s original speech.137 
Real enforcement was the third (and crucial) part of the FCC’s three-part 
strategy to regulate the Internet.138 Adjudication and enforcement require 
sustained effort.139 In comparison, the FDA has brought intermittent 
 
 130. Id. at 561 (“By the late 1990s, technological and market conditions had outpaced 
the premises that underpinned the Telecommunications Act of 1996.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 67 
(2005); Weiser, supra note 39, at 563–64. 
 132. See Weiser, supra note 39, at 531 (arguing that early non-regulation of the Internet 
by the FCC was appropriate, but now it is not). 
 133. Wu, supra note 11, at 1844–45 (citing Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC, 
Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry, Remarks at the Silicon 
Flatirons Symposium on “The Digital Broadbrand Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime 
for the Internet Age” (Feb. 8, 2004), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_ 
public/attachmatch/DOC-243556A1.pdf). 
 134. See Wu, supra note 11, at 1845 (discussing Madison River Communications, LLC, 
20 FCC Rcd. 4295 (2005), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4102/ 
m1/371. 
 135. Madison River, 20 FCC Rcd. 4295, 4296 (citing the Communications Act of 1934, 47 
U.S.C. § 201(b)); Weiser, supra note 39, at 563. 
 136. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://digital. 
library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4091/m1/708.  
 137. Wu, supra note 11, at 1852; Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905 
(Dec. 21, 2010), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc39308/m1/451.  
 138. See Weiser, supra note 39, at 584–89. 
 139. See id. at 585–86 (noting various deficiencies and underuse of the FCC’s 
Enforcement Bureau and administrative law judges (“ALJs”)). 
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enforcement actions against software products,140 but it has not brought 
enough high-profile cases to offset its primary reliance on nonbinding (and 
since withdrawn) guidance. 
The FCC deployed threats as a short-term precursor to more traditional, 
binding regulation; the FDA relied on threats as a long-term crutch. And 
unlike the FDA, the FCC did not make empty threats. These disparate 
experiences reveal important limitations on agency threats. 
IV. THE REGULATORY TOOLKIT FOR DISRUPTIVE 
INNOVATIONS 
By its nature, disruptive innovation challenges regulators. U.S. culture 
values innovation, sometimes for its own sake, and does not want regulation 
to be technologically regressive.141 At the same time, new technologies can 
disturb existing regulatory frameworks, triggering intense public debates 
about whether they are compatible with accepted social and legal norms.142 
Instinctively, most assume that regulating novel technologies requires more 
information and longer decision-making processes than familiar, established 
technologies do.143 
Compounding the challenge, regulators like the FDA and FCC must 
make four different types of decisions when confronting novel technologies 
or business practices. The decision to rely on agency “threats” is not only a 
decision about the form of intervention, but also about the timing of 
intervention, how durable that intervention should be, and how rigorously 
 
 140. For example, the FDA has an online database of warning letters issued to 
suspected violators. It categorizes these warning letters by subject, with three relating to 
device software: “Devices/Computer Software,” listing only two warning letters (one in 
1997 and one in 1998); “Devices/Patient Monitors Software,” listing one warning letter 
from 1999; and “QSR for Medical Devices/Picture Archiving & Communication Systems 
Software/Adulterated,” listing one warning letter in 2001. FDA’s Electronic Reading Room–
Warning Letters, FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/warningletters/wlFilter 
BySubject.cfm (last visited Nov. 9, 2013) (follow hyperlinks from subject index to individual 
subjects). Of course, these database categories may not be comprehensive, and a search 
through the FDA’s warning letter database for “software” generates many more results 
(although some of these do not concern software devices, but software used for 
manufacturing or other reasons). 
 141. See Huber, supra note 10, at 1028. 
 142. Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial 
Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1035–36 (2002). 
 143. Cf. Super, supra note 68, at 1411, 1416–17 (noting that “commentators assume that 
more information is an unalloyed good” and that “delaying decision making is necessary to 
allow procedures consistent with careful deliberation or broad participation,” while new 
technologies can “complicate” and “chang[e] the optimal timing of” decision-making). 
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the agency should monitor and sanction noncompliance. The regulator thus 
makes four related types of decisions:  
 
1.  Timing: When should the agency intervene, if at all? Does waiting 
necessarily generate a better informational basis on which to regulate? 
What are the drawbacks of waiting? 
2.  Form: Should the agency regulate via rule, adjudication, guidance, or 
some alternate form? Given the costs and benefits of each, which 
best accommodates the uncertainties of the innovation? Does form 
even matter? 
3. Durability: Should the agency’s intervention be permanent, or 
temporary, or conditional? How long should it endure? And are there 
ways to better calibrate regulatory interventions to the innovation? 
4.  Enforcement: How rigorously should the agency monitor and 
sanction noncompliance? How much should agencies temper 
enforcement against novel products, firms, or industries?  
 
With each decision, an agency must prioritize competing claims on these 
questions by different constituents, including Congress, the President, 
industry, and regulatory beneficiaries (those who benefit from the regulation 
of others).144 
This Part considers how agencies might respond to disruptive innovation 
along these four dimensions. Informal agency “threats” seem, at first glance, 
like a nice middle groundallowing agencies to say something early, but in a 
malleable and nonbinding way, while preserving maximum flexibility to 
gather more information. However, this Article questions the emerging 
sentiment that regulators should use “threats” to maintain a flexible stance, 
drawing lessons from the FDA’s approach to software and the FCC’s 
approach to the Internet. As explained above, the FCC disciplined its threats 
with timely enforcement and rulemaking. But the FDA’s strategy 
compounded its problems along each dimension: on timing, it was late; on 
form, it was casual; on durability, it was transient; and on enforcement, it was 
spotty. These cumulative defects have undermined the FDA’s long-term 
authority over software and raise serious questions about the prevailing 
orthodoxy on regulating new technologies. 
 
 144. Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 
CORNELL. L. REV. 397, 401–02 (2007). 
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A. TIMING 
For regulators confronting disruptive technologies, timing is paramount. 
Premature regulation might suffocate new technologies.145 Regulating with 
alacrity risks regulating in error.146 Yet, deferring regulation to some future 
date forgoes the benefits that would accrue to the public while the 
technology is being regulated.147 As the FDA’s posture on software reveals, 
initial reticence to regulate can easily harden into a long-term, laissez faire 
default. Introductory stances often remain unexamined. 
With novel technologies, agencies also risk paralysis by analysis. New 
technologies often present unforeseen risks if under-regulated148 and 
dramatic opportunity costs if overregulated.149 The inclination of most 
regulators is to avoid both extremes. Thus, the timing calculus is highly 
variable for new technologies. Agencies understandably agonize over it. 
Despite the stakes, legal scholarship is oddly ambivalent about timing.150 
Administrative law scholars in particular are far more preoccupied with the 
form regulation takes rather than when agencies take it. But the two, no doubt, 
are connected. As Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner emphasize, decisions about 
the timing of laws can be just as important as decisions about their content.151 
David Super argues convincingly that regulatory decisions are often 
postponed counterproductively, usually to wait for more information and 
 
 145. Wu, supra note 11, at 1849. 
 146. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 544, 558 (2007). Gervais, in particular, is concerned with regulating in error. Gervais, 
supra note 11, at 674. 
 147. Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 558. 
 148. See, e.g., Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated 
Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 603, 614–24 (2003) (discussing mounting evidence of 
risks associated with the relatively unregulated field of assisted reproductive technology); 
Rabin, supra note 35, at 1304–05 (noting that, in the realm of health and safety regulation, 
“inaccurate, insufficiently protective, administrative decisions might lead to irreversible long-
term risks to society of devastating magnitude”); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, 
Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1296–1300 (2006) 
(suggesting reasons why regulators might err on the side of under-regulation).  
 149. Huber, supra note 10, at 1027. 
 150. Super, supra note 68, at 1379 (arguing that scholarship on timing tends to 
“confound the questions of when a decision should be made with who should make it”). A 
recent article that does focus sustained attention to timing focuses on legislative timing, 
giving only passing thought to administrative agencies. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 146. 
Gervais addresses the timing of regulation for new technologies, but relies on the axiom that 
“technological change happens faster than social change” to argue that regulation of new 
technologies may be premature and fraught with error. Gervais, supra note 11, at 683–84. 
 151. Gersen & Posner, supra note 146. 
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preserve maximum flexibility.152 This observation describes the FDA’s 
posture towards software. Regulatory flexibility and discretion sound good in 
theory. A flexible stance allows regulators to revisit and retreat to earlier 
positions if necessary, and tailor their approaches as they learn more. Indeed, 
American culture generally values flexibility and condemns inflexibility.153 
Our legal culture valorizes executive discretion.154 And legal scholarship in 
particular embraces regulatory flexibility, usually as a reaction to the 
ossification of agency rulemaking.155 
But flexibility often leads to what Super calls “legal procrastination” and 
a resulting regulatory inertia.156 Administrative law scholarship generally 
assumes that deferring action will necessarily lead agencies to use more 
robust, deliberative procedures that will generate more fair and accurate 
rules.157 But as the FDA’s policy towards software demonstrates, this 
assumption can be wrong. Flexibility and lengthy deliberation are only 
worthwhile if they will significantly improve the quality of the agency’s 
decision.158 Bureaucratic delay is widely recognized and condemned in 
American culture, but its costs to regulatory beneficiaries are infrequently 
studied.159 
Regulators also tend to overvalue gathering information about new 
technologies, which further distorts decisions on regulatory timing. The need 
for information has long been a key concern when addressing new risks.160 
Wu channels Freidrich Hayek in arguing that traditional regulation is 
 
 152. Super, supra note 68, at 1380, 1409. 
 153. Id. at 1409 (“In social life, calling someone ‘flexible’ is generally a compliment; 
inflexibility is characteristic of bullies, dinosaurs, and control freaks.”). 
 154. Id. at 1409. 
 155. Id. at 1410 n.148 (citing a string of very recent articles in a range of subjects touting 
flexibility); Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1523 (1996). 
 156. Super, supra note 68, at 1382. 
 157. Id. at 1398. 
 158. Id. at 1406. 
 159. One exception is the literature on delaying environmental regulation. See, e.g., Lea-
Rachel D. Kosnik, Sources of Bureaucratic Delay: A Case Study of FERC Dam Relicensing, 22 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 258 (2005); Hilary Sigman, The Pace of Progress at Superfund Sites: Policy Goals and 
Interest Group Influence, 44 J.L. & ECON. 315 (2001); Amy Whritenour Ando, Waiting to be 
Protected Under the Endangered Species Act: The Political Economy of Regulatory Delay, 42 J.L. & 
ECON. 29 (1999). 
 160. Gervais, supra note 11, at 684–87 (addressing the “unintended consequences” that 
generate from early regulatory intervention, even questioning the efficacy of regulatory 
requirements like car seatbelts). But see Huber, supra note 10, at 1051–52 (acknowledging the 
concern, but questioning its salience). 
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“impressive in a world of perfect information, but terrible in this world.”161 
However, for regulators, perfect information is often the enemy of good 
information.162 Culturally, we are situated firmly in the Information Age, and 
thus tend to overvalue information.163 We obsess about gathering all available 
information and recoil from making any big decisions without it.164 Legal 
culture in particular values information over other inputs into legal decisions, 
such as the capacity to implement and enforce laws.165 And the penetration 
of economics into legal thought, particularly the well-known market failure of 
information asymmetries, further aggravates this overemphasis on gathering 
information.166 
But more information does not necessarily equate to better information. 
Ironically, the more information we gather, the more effort it takes to make a 
decision based on it.167 Nor does information itself necessarily make agencies 
more efficient long-term. The more the FDA learned about device software, 
the more overwhelmed it became. Indeed, the FDA explained that it 
withdrew its 1989 Draft Software Policy because of the volume, variety, and 
complexity of medical device software.168 In fact, waiting for better 
information can be counterproductive. Agency flexibility can be overrated.169 
Too much of it can paralyze agencies,170 a notion that might offend our 
intuitions about how government should work. 
Equally important, early interventions can benefit both regulated industry 
and regulatory beneficiaries. As Super demonstrates, “[d]ecisions rarely 
become more valuable to society as a whole when rendered later.”171 Indeed, 
regulated parties may appreciate the added certainty and reduced cost of 
compliance with early regulatory decisions.172 The conventional wisdom that 
 
 161. Wu, supra note 11, at 1849 (citing F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. 
ECON. REV. 519, 519 (1945)). 
 162. Super, supra note 68, at 1380. 
 163. Id. at 1379. 
 164. Id. at 1409–10. 
 165. Id. at 1401 (“We avoid discussing deficiencies in decisional or enforcement capacity 
as they embarrass the law . . . .”). 
 166. Id. at 1401–02. 
 167. Id. (citing BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS 23 
(2004) (noting that information overload can paralyze decision making)). 
 168. 2011 Mobile Medical Applications Draft, supra note 97, at 5. 
 169. Super, supra note 68, at 1381 (using as case studies the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005). 
 170. Id. at 1381. 
 171. Id. at 1405. 
 172. Id. 
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regulation necessarily stifles innovation does not always hold.173 Indeed, an 
industry coalition of app developers and device makers opposed an effort in 
Congress to prohibit the FDA from finalizing a draft guidance on mobile 
software for eighteen months.174 Industry can benefit from early, clear 
regulation. 
The obvious exceptions are when the early regulatory intervention is 
deeply flawed, or when no intervention is needed, either because the problem 
is not severe enough or because it occurs with low frequency.175 But from the 
agency’s perspective, early decisions can capitalize on a motivated regulator’s 
early passion for and attention to the issue,176 which may wane over time 
absent an external shock. Typically, the shock is some tragedy followed by 
Congressional intervention forcing the agency to respond.177 And such 
reactionary regulation is likely to be more severe and potentially 
miscalibrated.178 
Early interventions may also benefit from a more objective regulatory 
atmosphere, before parties become entrenched and adversarial. In contrast, 
deferring action (usually in the name of preserving discretion and gathering 
information), often leads to incremental decision making, which is more 
susceptible to interest group influence.179 Agencies that precommit to policies 
earlier can better avoid bias and capture, emulating (very crudely) a Rawlsian 
“veil of ignorance.”180 Although regulated firms generally prefer certainty, 
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and thus should prefer definite rules, current efforts tend to be aimed 
primarily at weakening agency oversight.181 Delay may invite obstruction. 
Of course, early intervention imposes costs on industry—costs that may 
be too heavy for fledgling industries to bear. And regulators should be aware 
of legal “transitions” that upset settled expectations.182 The government 
should remain sensitive (as it has been under the Obama administration)183 to 
imposing new costs on firms. 
That said, recent experience with other new technologies illustrates the 
consequences of unregulated medical innovation.184 For example, assisted 
reproductive technologies (“ART”) like artificial embryo implantation 
proliferated in the 1980s and 1990s without any real FDA oversight, and 
despite the lack of clinical evidence that these interventions were safe and 
effective.185 In the meantime, unproven reproductive technologies gave rise 
to a significant industry, and “questions quickly arose about the accuracy of 
promotional claims.”186 Arguably, neither tort law, state oversight, nor 
professional self-regulation filled in.187 A similar story describes the explosive 
growth of the dietary supplement industry, which also advanced with very 
 
decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens that will result 
from the decision.” Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE 
L.J. 399, 399 (2001). 
 181. Super, supra note 68, at 1428. 
 182. Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 128 (2003); 
Huber, supra note 10, at 1064 (noting that “transition costs are largely absent when new 
products are regulated”); Kaplow, supra note 175. 
 183. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 76 
Fed. Reg. 3821, 3822 (Jan. 21, 2011) (calling for federal agencies to identify ways to achieve 
regulatory goals “that are designed to promote innovation,” promote regulatory flexibility, 
and reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens). 
 184. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 148. 
 185. See id. 
 186. Id. at 614. 
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by proposing rules, and sent warning letters with notices of violations. See Current Good 
Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 1508 (2001); Establishment Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of Human 
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,744 (1998); Noah, supra note 148, at 
650–51. It is also contested whether tort law and self-regulation by the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (“ASRM”) did indeed fill the regulatory void. See, e.g., Kimberly M. 
Mutcherson, Welcome to the Wild West: Protecting Access to Cross Border Fertility Care in the United 
States, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 361–62 (2012) (discussing the United States’ “not 
completely deserved reputation as the Wild West of fertility treatment”). 
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little meaningful oversight188 and with very little evidence to support its 
claims.189 As noted, waiting does not necessarily generate superior regulation. 
B. FORM 
A parallel decision for regulators confronting new technologies is form. 
Agencies are unique among government institutions in having several choices 
of policymaking form.190 For years, scholars have debated whether agencies 
should make policy ex ante via rulemaking or ex post via adjudication.191 The 
debate used to weigh these two primary modes, until rulemaking began to 
predominate in the 1970s.192 By the early 1990s, the debate had shifted to 
rulemaking versus guidance, just as agencies began to rely on guidances even 
more than rules.193 
Like most agencies, the FDA is statutorily authorized to choose among 
these forms.194 Agencies enjoy significant discretion, as this choice is virtually 
immune from judicial review.195 This Section evaluates the three primary 
forms of policymaking (rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance), as well as 
newer forms, and whether these forms matter when confronting new 
 
 188. The lack of oversight of dietary supplements was not due to the FDA dragging its 
feet, but to Congress tying the FDA’s hands. See Symposium: The Dietary Supplement Health and 
Education Act: Regulation at a Crossroads, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 147–364 (2005) (providing a 
comprehensive overview of how Congress prevented FDA action). 
 189. There have been many takedowns of the dietary supplement industry. For a recent 
survey of evidence (especially the lack thereof), see PAUL A. OFFIT, DO YOU BELIEVE IN 
MAGIC? THE SENSE AND NONSENSE OF ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE (2013) (finding that only 
four of the 51,000 supplements on the U.S. market are supported by valid scientific 
evidence). 
 190. Magill, supra note 55. 
 191. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 562–63 (1992) (wrestling with whether decision making via enforcement and 
adjudication are more efficient than rulemaking ex ante); Magill, supra note 55, at 1403 n.69 
(citing two decades of literature on the subject); Super, supra note 68, at 1411–12. 
 192. Magill, supra note 55, at 1398–99 (noting that after Congress passed the APA in 
1946, most agencies carried out their statutory obligations by adjudication in the 1950s and 
1960s, shifting decidedly towards broad-based rulemaking in the 1970s). 
 193. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 398 (noting that the volume of guidances is 
“massive” compared to rules). Aware of this trend and suspicious of abuse, the House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held hearings and issued a report in 
2000. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009 (2000). In response, the EPA revealed that it had issued 
over 2000 guidances between 1996 and 1999, and OSHA revealed over 3,000 during the 
same period. In comparison, the EPA issued only 100 “significant” rules and OSHA twenty 
during that same period. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 399.  
 194. Magill, supra note 55, at 1388 n.11 (citing, for example, 21 U.S.C. §§ 334, 371(a) 
(2000)). 
 195. Id. at 1405–42 (discussing the germinal case, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 
(1947)). 
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technologies. I argue that, in retrospect, the FDA’s reliance on guidance 
weakened its oversight of software, and that it now risks repeating its mistake 
with the next generation of software. 
1. Rulemaking 
The FDA could have proceeded by rule. The benefits of rules are 
many,196 although enthusiasm for them long ago waned. Rules can set clear, 
authoritative, and durable requirements. The rulemaking process uses robust, 
transparent procedures that accommodate broad public participation.197 The 
rulemaking process is designed to ventilate issues of broad public concern 
and is particularly suitable when the problem is widespread and 
foreseeable.198 As such, rulemaking can be more efficient than making policy 
via individualized adjudication, as federal agencies discovered in the 1960s 
and 1970s.199 Rules are widely published and are more easily accessible than 
adjudications, although this advantage is slighter in an era of agency 
websites.200 Rules are also subject to more oversight by politically accountable 
institutions, like Congress and the President. But above all, rules bind. 
Agencies can enforce them. This was the chief limitation of the FDA’s 
reliance on guidance. 
Of course, the disadvantages of rulemaking are also abundant, as well 
canvassed by scholars. The most familiar is that promulgating rules requires a 
long, lumbering process201—one that is almost universally condemned as 
being ossified and prolonged by cumulative procedural burdens,202 including 
executive review and various statutory hurdles.203 Studies confirm this 
 
 196. See generally Arthur Earl Bonfield, State Administrative Policy Formulation and the Choice 
of Lawmaking Methodology, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 122–36 (1990) (discussing the benefits of 
rulemaking vis-à-vis adjudication). 
 197. Rulemaking by federal agencies is governed by § 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 198. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292–94 (1974) (discussing when a 
legislative rule would be appropriate in reviewing agency choices for an abuse of discretion); 
cf. Magill, supra note 55, at 1408. 
 199. Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 
1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 376 (1978). 
 200. Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, supra note 60, at 
1374. 
 201. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 202. Magill, supra note 55, at 1390–91, 1391 n.17 (citing the “large literature on the 
‘ossification’ of the rulemaking process”). Mark Seidenfeld once counted 109 discrete 
rulemaking requirements. Mark Seidenfeld, A Table of Requirements for Federal Administrative 
Rulemaking, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533 (2000). 
 203. There are well-known executive burdens that apply to most rulemaking, the most 
recognized being review by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) in 
the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”). See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291, Federal 
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critique, finding that rulemaking at some agencies can take upwards of two 
years to complete.204 At the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”), for example, the average duration of rulemaking without a 
statutorily imposed deadline was a staggering 817 days.205 
Rules are also critiqued for being inflexible. They are hard to update, as 
doing so requires another round of notice and comment.206 Rules also can be 
overinclusive or underinclusive, and thus unjust.207 And like statutes, rules are 
prospective, so they must be general enough to accommodate unforeseen 
conduct.208 These factors undoubtedly weigh on agency decisions to forgo 
rulemaking. 
2. Adjudication 
The FDA also could have established policy via adjudication, which has 
its own pros and cons. Among the pros, adjudication allows agencies to 
address problems in discrete, concrete circumstances, rather than 
prospectively and abstractly, as with rulemaking.209 Agencies can use 
 
Regulation, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 3 
C.F.R. 638, 638, 642, 644 (1994) (§ 4 “Planning Mechanism” and § 6 “Centralized Review of 
Regulations”). And as many authors observe, there are lesser-known rulemaking 
requirements imposed by statute. Erica Seiguer & John J. Smith, Perception and Process at the 
Food and Drug Administration: Obligations and Trade-Offs in Rules and Guidances, 60 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 17, 19 (2005) (“In addition to the APA, there are a number of laws that impact 
the development of rules . . . . [A] variety of Executive Orders . . . also apply.”); Connor N. 
Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 
788, 788 n.16 (2010) (“Agencies must also complete a number of lesser-known procedural 
requirements before issuing a legislative rule.”); e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501–71, 1532–35 (2012); Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
Fairness Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.); Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012); 
Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012); Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. 
§ 1505 (2012); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3549 (2012); Small 
Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3504(c), 3506(i), 3520 (2012). 
 204. Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 923, 988 tbl.12 (2008) (studying the period between 1988 and 2003, and noting 
rulemaking actions without congressionally imposed deadlines). 
 205. Id. 
 206. See Mendelson, supra note 144, at 410. 
 207. Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 440–41 (1999); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in 
the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 446 (2003) (noting that centralized, 
command-and-control regulation “suffers from the inherent problems involved in 
attempting to dictate the conduct of millions of actors in a quickly changing and very 
complex economy and society throughout a large and diverse nation.”); see also Mendelson, 
supra note 144, at 438. 
 208. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 410. 
 209. Bonfield, supra note 196, at 122–36. 
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adjudication to respond quickly to problematic conduct as it arises.210 
Adjudication also allows agencies to create policy incrementally, in the 
absence of consensus.211 Another benefit is that agencies can also target 
egregious, outlier conduct that does not occur often enough to require 
broad-based rulemaking.212 And if the conduct of individual firms differs in 
key ways, adjudication can account for that.213 
But like rulemaking, adjudication has well-known deficiencies. 
Adjudication does not invite broad public participation, so it can be awkward 
for establishing broader policies.214 Agencies can choose sympathetic targets 
for adjudication, whose conduct may not fairly represent industry practices.215 
Any precedents established in adjudication can be limited by facts peculiar to 
the case.216 Moreover, precedents technically bind only the parties.217 Thus, 
agencies pushing new legal theories or interpretations face problems with fair 
notice, and may find it difficult to enforce the new position.218 Formal 
administrative adjudications resemble judicial trials, with all their 
inefficiencies.219 And agencies wishing to enforce their adjudications in court 
must convince the Department of Justice to take up their cause.220 
Adjudication may also be inefficient vis-à-vis rulemaking when the agency 
has to relitigate the issue repeatedly. 
Yet the familiar dichotomy between rulemaking and adjudication can be a 
false one. The two must coexist if agencies wish to enforce rules and clarify 
them in individualized applications.221 Rules can be toothless without 
enforcement, and enforcement requires something to enforce. Guidances can 
depart from this symbiosis. 
3. Guidances 
When the FDA first announced a software policy in 1987, it chose to 
make policy via guidance—a pattern it continues today. For agencies, the 
major attraction of guidances is that guidances need not comply with the 
 
 210. Magill, supra note 55, at 1396–97. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 1444–45. 
 214. Magill, supra note 55, at 1396. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 436. 
 219. 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 (2012) (including the APA’s procedures for formal 
adjudication and rulemaking); Magill, supra note 55, at 1391. 
 220. Magill, supra note 55, at 1391, 1393. 
 221. Bonfield, supra note 196, at 122–36. 
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notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures required by the APA222 or any 
other statute.223 Publishing guidances is quicker than even most forms of 
adjudication.224 Compared to rulemaking, guidances are a very economical 
way to signal agency preferences.225 They give agencies greater flexibility to 
update or retreat from the policy when necessary.226 Guidances are useful for 
coordinating lower level agency personnel.227 Agencies may also prefer 
guidances because they are virtually immune from pre-enforcement judicial 
review and are subject to less congressional oversight.228 Finally, guidances 
are generally credible,229 and they can be “sticky” like regulations.230 
Agencies are known to use guidances to clarify highly technical or 
scientific requirements that would be difficult to update via rulemaking or 
 
 222. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). In the early 1980s, Congress considered bills that would have 
required agencies to use notice-and-comment procedures for many guidances, but none of 
these bills passed. See H.R. 2327, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 220, 98th Cong. (1983); S. 1080, 
97th Cong. (1982); H.R. 746, 97th Cong. (1981); Mendelson, supra note 144, at 401 & n.25. 
 223. Note, however, that even the guidance document process is becoming burdened by 
procedure. In 2007, the Bush administration published Executive Order 13,422, which 
allows the OMB to require agencies to consult with it before issuing a “significant” guidance 
document, defined as one that has an economic impact of more than $100 million in any 
single year, or raises important legal issues (among other criteria). Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 
C.F.R. 191–92 (2007) (rescinded by President Obama’s Exec. Order. No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 
218 (2013)). 
 224. See Magill, supra note 55, at 1391–92 (describing developing guidances as “relatively 
cheap[]” for agencies in comparison to adjudication and formal rulemaking). 
 225. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 
404–08 (1985) (arguing that agencies rely on guidance documents when budgetary pressures 
require it); Mendelson, supra note 144, at 408. In the words of one FDA official, “In an ideal 
world, we would always do rulemaking, but it is not as responsive and there is a lot of 
process involved, not only internal to the agency, but outside FDA.” Seiguer & Smith, supra 
note 203, at 24. Another FDA official said, “To do a rule, it’s a huge ordeal . . . there are 
economic analyses of the impact, notice and comment, involvement of the OMB, etc.” Id.; 
see also Gersen & Posner, supra note 59, at 588–89, 594–95 (describing the similar allure of 
soft law statutes by Congress). 
 226. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 408. 
 227. Peter L. Strauss, Publication Rules in the Rulemaking Spectrum: Assuring Proper Respect for 
an Essential Element, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 803, 808 (2001). 
 228. Magill, supra note 55, at 1395; Mendelson, supra note 144, at 408. 
 229. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 59, at 589 (noting that soft law can be credible 
even when it is not costly to speak). 
 230. The rulemaking process has been criticized as being inefficient and “sticky.” See, 
e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1997); Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 819, 822 (2008) (book review) (discussing the “stickiness of the rulemaking process”). 
But stickiness may be good, if the agency wants the guidance to endure. 
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adjudication.231 These issues may require “a scalpel, not a sledgehammer.”232 
Indeed, there is almost a consensus in the literature that guidances are more 
appropriate than rulemaking to address rapid technological and scientific 
advancement, as Wu argues.233 In a recent study, representatives from both 
the FDA and regulated industry agreed on this use of guidances.234 
But for all the glowing evaluations, relying on guidance does pose 
problems. Many scholars suspect that agencies abuse guidance as a way to 
skirt procedure,235 though a recent study disputes this.236 Agency 
consideration may not be disciplined the same way as when subject to the 
procedures governing rulemaking and adjudication237—although in FDA’s 
case its consideration is tempered by its Good Guidance Practices, and for 
most agencies by executive review protocols.238 Guidances are hailed for their 
flexibility, yet one study found that they are updated with even less frequency 
than rules.239 And if agencies use guidances to address scientific and technical 
issues, they might be doing so at the expense of public input. 
The major shortcoming is that guidance is not enforceable. Agencies 
cannot allege violations of guidance documents or initiate enforcement 
actions based solely on them.240 Defenders of guidance tend to emphasize its 
 
 231. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 545–56 (2003); Raso, supra note 203, at 815 
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 232. Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier for Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 277 
(2008). 
 233. See Wu, supra note 11, at 1842, 1848–54. 
 234. See, e.g., Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 23. Seiguer and Smith interviewed 
several representatives from the FDA and industry, and found that “[t]hose interviewed 
agreed that due to the rapid pace of scientific advancement, guidances . . . provide the best 
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regulatory requirements.” In fact, they noted that a common theme among interviewees was 
“[t]he importance of guidances in an era of complex science.” Id. 
 235. Raso, supra note 203, at 785–87. 
 236. Id. at 809–23 (reviewing five agencies (EPA, FCC, FDA, IRS, and OSHA) over ten 
years (1996–2006) and finding that agencies generally do not use guidance documents to 
avoid rulemaking, at least for “significant” policies). Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner discuss 
some of the same “rule of law” objections to soft law by Congress. Gersen & Posner, supra 
note 59, at 597–98. Others have proposed procedural reforms to legitimate guidances. See, 
e.g., Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the 
Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343 (2009). 
 237. Magill, supra note 55, at 1397, 1446. 
 238. See 21 U.S.C. § 371(h) (2012); FDA Good Guidance Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 
(2013). 
 239. Raso, supra note 203, at 818–19 (noting, however, the limitations of the available 
data). 
 240. William Funk, When is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative 
Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 661–62 (2002); Magill, supra note 55, at 
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benefits to industry without contemplating how it can disadvantage 
regulatory beneficiaries.241 Even an open, transparent guidance process like 
the FDA’s can skew heavily towards industry, per Nina Mendelson’s critique 
that agencies generally solicit comments on guidance from industry, but not 
from regulatory beneficiaries.242 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, most scholars agree that some guidance 
is better than none.243 But it is far from clear that doing nothing is the only 
counterfactual, or that guidance is always preferable to rulemaking, 
particularly when enforcement matters.244 Agencies like the FDA still choose 
to promulgate rules when they desire enforceability.245 
In many ways, the FDA’s reliance on guidance is notable. The FDA is a 
serial user, dating back to 1902, when its precursor first used them.246 Today, 
the FDA issues roughly twice as many guidances as it does rules,247 and the 
ratio has increased steadily since the 1970s.248 By the 1990s, the FDA was 
generating proportionally fewer regulations and more guidances, such that 
guidances became the agency’s primary mode of policymaking.249 By the late 
 
1394; Mendelson, supra note 144, at 406–07, 410. Indeed, courts have prohibited agencies 
from trying to bind regulated firms via guidance documents. See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. 
v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000); McLouth Steel Prods. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 
1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 
Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
 241. See generally Mendelson, supra note 144, at 402, 413–14 (noting that commentators 
tend to defend guidances by arguing that they are better than nothing at signaling regulators’ 
intent and help keep the conduct of agencies’ employees consistent). 
 242. Id. at 427–29 (noting the general tendency of agencies to “float” draft guidances to 
industry contacts and solicit comments from them but not the public, and describing the 
FAA’s quite disturbing practice of accepting comments on guidance documents only from a 
list of seventeen industry organizations, which does not include passenger or consumer 
safety groups). 
 243. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Guidance Documents in the States: Toward a Safe Harbor, 54 
ADMIN. L. REV. 631, 647 (2002); Asimow, supra note 225, at 381; Mendelson, supra note 144, 
at 413. 
 244. Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 28. 
 245. Id. 
 246. K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 509 (2011). 
 247. Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 25–26 (finding that during 2001, 2002, and most 
of 2003, the FDA issued well more than twice as many guidances (298) as rules (129)). 
 248. Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative 
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159, 168 (2000) (noting the marked increase in the ratio of 
guidance documents to rules from the 1970s through the 1990s). 
 249. Lewis, supra note 246, at 520. In fact, the FDA center responsible for regulating 
medical devices, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (“CDRH”), has relied far 
more on guidances than other centers in the agency. Between 1975 and 2009, CDRH 
published 659 guidances, compared to 507 by the drug center (“CDER”), 294 by the 
biologics center (“CBER”), and 190 by the food center (“CFSCAN”). Id. at 549–50 fig.5. 
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1990s, observers were already wondering whether rulemaking at the FDA 
had become an artifact from earlier ages.250 
The FDA is also notable for being the only agency whose guidance 
practices are governed by statute and regulation.251 The FDA initially 
proposed its own “Good Guidance Practices” by regulation in 1992.252 
Congress then codified the regulation by statute in 1997.253 Together the two 
documents require the FDA to solicit public input and use notice-and-
comment-like procedures when creating guidances.254 Importantly, the statute 
requires that FDA staff generally follow the agency’s own guidances.255 
Yet, at the end of the day, even FDA guidances cannot bind as a matter 
of law256 (though some report that individual FDA staff sometimes say 
otherwise).257 When push comes to shove in court, the FDA must point to 
statutes and regulations, not guidance. Any paths blazed via guidance remain 
legally quarantined until the agency takes action to “codify” them. 
4. New Forms? 
We are undoubtedly in a new era of policymaking pluralism, so the menu 
for agencies like the FDA is more varied. The traditional substrata of 
rulemaking, adjudication, and guidance now support variations like 
negotiated rulemaking, waiver systems, and other more flexible, collaborative 
forms that are often called regulatory “experimentalism” or “new 
governance.”258 Agencies that struggle with limited, stagnant resources are 
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increasingly looking to alternatives.259 The recent scholarly trend is to 
champion nimble agencies that practice regulatory experimentalism in 
response to changing circumstances.260 Even the hoary FDA drug approval 
process promises to benefit from experimentalism, argue proponents of new 
governance like Charles Sabel and Bill Simon.261 
Although the FDA did not explicitly choose an experimental method 
with software, one cannot help but sense from the agency a collaborative 
mood in some of its public hearings (during which FDA comments were 
more than solicitous of industry and, somewhat asymmetrically, the industry 
was not shy about voicing displeasure with the FDA’s approach).262 This 
highlights how regulatory experimentalism can take for granted the 
“adversarial legalism” of our regulatory system—our tendency to formally 
contest policymaking.263 Regardless of the form policymaking takes, industry 
will find ways to contest it. 
5. Does Form Matter? 
It is possible that the differences among policymaking forms are 
overstated. For example, as Nina Mendelson notes, guidances frequently 
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resemble rules, which is why they are often called “nonlegislative rules.”264 
Indeed, courts review whether agencies treat nonlegislative rules as having 
the force of law.265 Scholars have long recognized that finding meaningful 
doctrinal distinctions between legislative and nonlegislative rules is a task 
“enshrouded in considerable smog.”266 
Moreover, regulated parties may not appreciate the limited legal status of 
guidances,267 as they generally comply with them anyway.268 Most observers 
note that industries choose to treat guidances as binding for practical 
purposes,269 even after Congress pressured agencies to more clearly label their 
guidances as such and disclaim any legally binding effect.270 The FTC even 
declares (in the Code of Federal Regulations, no less) that it may initiate 
enforcement actions against parties that do not comply with its guidances.271  
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 266. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 
120 YALE L.J. 276, 286–87 (2010) (citing both courts and scholars that have struggled with 
the distinction). 
 267. In fairness to regulated industry, the legal status of FDA guidance documents has 
always been confusing. For example, in 1977, the FDA promulgated a regulation binding 
itself with officially published advisory opinions and guidelines. 42 Fed. Reg. 4680, 4708–10 
(1977). Although this stance was ostensibly superseded by the agency’s Good Guidance 
Practices, 21 C.F.R. § 10.115 (declaring that guidances are nonbinding at § 10.115(i)(i), 
(i)(iv)), there remains some confusion. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 246. 
 268. Mendelson argues that regulated parties comply with guidance documents rather 
than bear the expense, uncertainty, and acrimony of challenging them in court. Mendelson, 
supra note 144, at 407–08. This does not address guidance documents that are un- or under-
enforced by the agency, which parties would have little incentive to challenge as they age and 
become stale. Nevertheless, Seiguer and Smith found that “in practice, most of those 
interviewed [from the FDA and regulated industries] said that industry treats guidances no 
differently than rules.” Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 29–30 (noting that this response 
reflected “the majority of those interviewed,” and emphasizing that “industry is loathe to 
diverge from the agency’s current thinking embodied in the guidance”).  
 269. Mendelson, supra note 144, at 407–08; Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 29–30. 
 270. See COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, NON-BINDING LEGAL EFFECT OF AGENCY 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 106-1009, at 8–9 (2000); Mendelson, supra note 
144, at 400 & n.17 (noting that the Committee’s critiques “probably led the agencies to add 
disclaimers more systematically”). 
 271. Of course, the FTC is careful to note that such enforcement would rely on 
statutory violations. 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (2013) (“Failure to comply with the guides may result in 
corrective action by the Commission under applicable statutory provisions. Guides may 
relate to a practice common to many industries or to specific practices of a particular 
industry.”). 
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As with rules, the APA requires agencies to publish most guidance 
documents in the Federal Register or in some other accessible source.272 
Sometimes Congress even requires agencies by statute to publish 
guidances.273 As a result, many agencies, particularly the FDA, find 
themselves dedicating substantial time and resources to guidances.274 
As Elizabeth Magill suggests, we might be more concerned with the 
outcome of agency action than “the package in which it is wrapped.”275 But 
Magill also notes that policymaking form dictates important things like its 
scope, the parties’ procedural rights, enforceability, and judicial review.276 
Moreover, the intuition that guidances give industry timely notice of new 
requirements while rulemaking does not is probably overwrought. Draft 
guidances are sometimes never finalized and agencies propose rules far 
before they are finalized.277 The regulatory uncertainty argument thus rings 
hollow as to form. In fact, both the FDA and industry representatives 
observed that the agency often takes a long time to articulate a concrete 
position on new issues, regardless of whether it chooses rulemaking or 
guidance.278 The FDA’s draft guidances are known to linger for years before 
being finalized.279 Many morph into de facto final guidances,280 as the 1989 
Draft Software Policy did. 
Finally, differences in form may be overstated because they are not 
mutually exclusive. The reality is that “[m]any agencies regularly employ a 
mix of policymaking tools on a given issue—sometimes promulgating or 
amending a rule, sometimes bringing an enforcement action, and sometimes 
issuing a guidance document.”281 Threats can start informally before 
 
 272. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (2012) (requiring publication of interpretive rules and 
policy statements in the Federal Register); § 552(a)(2)(b) (requiring public accessibility of 
important guidance documents that are not in the Federal Register).  
 273. See, e.g., Raso, supra note 203, at 814 n.144 (citing the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 § 212, 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2012), which requires agencies to 
issue compliance guides for small businesses on important rules). 
 274. See Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 24 (quoting an anonymous interviewee as 
stating, “Ideally, [guidances] should be faster and more flexible, but in practice, they may 
take as long as rules to develop.”). 
 275. Magill, supra note 55, at 1419 (explaining why courts might be reluctant to review 
the vehicles agencies choose to use for policymaking, ultimately deciding that form does 
matter). 
 276. Id. at 1420. 
 277. A recent commentary finds that, on balance, guidances benefit regulated industry, 
generalizing this point on regulatory certainty. See Lewis, supra note 246, at 541. 
 278. See Seiguer & Smith, supra note 203, at 31. 
 279. See id. 
 280. See id. 
 281. Magill, supra note 55, at 1410. 
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percolating into adjudication. For example, the FDA issues frequent 
“warning letters” to alleged regulatory violators. Warning letters are informal 
and are not considered official enforcement action.282 But the industry treats 
FDA warning letters as precedent, and lawyers advise clients based on them. 
The FDA’s warning letters all cite specific statutory or regulatory violations, 
which then form the basis of any subsequent judicial enforcement. 
In the end, the choice of policymaking form may not be as stark as it 
once was. And one form does not preclude another. But the FDA’s decision 
to address software by guidance, to the exclusion of rulemaking, necessarily 
weakened its enforcement posture. 
C. DURABILITY 
The third question for agencies confronting disruptive innovation is how 
durable to make their policies. A concern with rulemaking is that it might be 
too durable for evolving technologies, hence the intuitive appeal of informal 
“threats.” Agencies can temper concerns over the timing and form of 
policies by manipulating how long the policy will endure. 
Of course, a policy’s durability will be dictated in large part by its form.283 
For example, we might be particularly concerned about the durability of 
guidances given the transience of agency leadership. Political appointees, who 
often set regulatory priorities, spend an average of only eighteen to twenty-
four months with their agencies.284 Transient appointees, not to mention 
transient administrations, can undermine agency guidances by not adhering 
to them or by simply deprioritizing them. Although rules are also subject to 
amendment and rescission, they tend to be more resilient.285 
The trick is to craft enduring policy under high uncertainty.286 Even large 
federal bureaucracies like the FDA cannot make perfectly calibrated 
decisions about new products or conduct.287 So-called “timing rules,” 
contemplated by Gersen and Posner in the legislative context,288 might help. 
 
 282. The FDA includes “warning letters” in its definition of informal enforcement 
actions. 21 C.F.R. § 100.2(j)(1) (2013). 
 283. See Raso, supra note 203, at 803. 
 284. Id. at 803 (citing Paul C. Light, Our Tottering Confirmation Process, BROOKINGS (Spring 
2002), http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/spring_governance_light.aspx). 
 285. Id. 
 286. See generally Fried, supra note 182, at 146–51 (discussing economic and empirical 
literature of decision making under uncertainty, weighing ex ante versus ex post decision 
making). 
 287. See Wu, supra note 11. 
 288. See generally Gersen & Posner, supra note 146. 
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Like legislators, regulators can manipulate the timing and duration of 
their interventions.289 Options include mandatory deadlines, waiting periods, 
interim periods, phases, and sunsets.290 These can control the timing of how 
laws are considered, enacted, and implemented, with the purpose of 
achieving some optimum result in the public interest.291 For example, 
agencies frequently use interim final rules to impose new requirements 
immediately while extending public comment on them. Such tools can be 
most useful when operating under uncertainty, as they allow lawmakers to 
“economize on legislative costs, address problems quickly or enable citizens 
to adjust, and handle uncertainty about the effects of a legislative 
proposal.”292 The more inchoate the technology, the less “durable” the 
regulator might want its policy to be.293 
Here, two particularly promising possibilities are sunsets and deadlines. 
Other possibilities include deferred or conditional rulemaking,294 although 
these might only encourage further delay.295 
1. Sunsets 
Regulators can ease their anxiety over regulating new technologies 
prematurely or incorrectly by using sunsets—regulating temporarily. 
Congress frequently uses sunset clauses and other forms of temporary 
legislation that specify a finite duration.296 Sunsets are useful when the 
benefits of intervening are uncertain, as they reduce the costs of errors and 
allow regulators to gather better information.297 They can also counterbalance 
 
 289. See id. at 545 (defining a “timing rule” as “a rule that substantially affects the timing 
of government action, including legislation and executive action,” and typically includes 
deadlines and mandatory delays). 
 290. Id.  
 291. Id. at 546. 
 292. Id. at 563. 
 293. See Gervais, supra note 11, at 701. 
 294. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 562 (describing deferred and conditional 
legislation). 
 295. Gersen and Posner detail, somewhat optimistically, four benefits of delay rules for 
administrative agencies: (i) they allow agencies to gather more information, (ii) they “might 
reduce the effect of deliberative pathologies” like polarization over an issue, (iii) they might 
allow agency executives to better oversee major initiatives, and (iv) they could mitigate 
interest group incentives to weaken the rule. Id. at 588. These benefits are suspect, as noted 
above. 
 296. See Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 250 (2007) 
(refuting “the notion that temporary legislation is a new, peculiar, or particularly suspect 
legislative tool”); Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 562 n.78 (noting that sunset clauses 
date back to the First Congress). 
 297. See Gersen, Temporary Legislation, supra note 296, at 248, 266–78 (noting that “when 
initial decisions are likely to be wrong, staged decision procedures facilitate the correction of 
 
 2014] REGULATING DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 219 
cognitive biases in assessing uncertainty and overreacting to new risks.298 
Sunset clauses proliferated among states during the regulatory reform 
movement of the 1970s and 1980s, on the theory that they would encourage 
more legislative oversight and thus make agencies more efficient and more 
responsive.299 
Despite their deregulatory roots, sunset clauses might be useful for 
addressing disruptive innovation. Temporary regulation would allow agencies 
like the FDA to impose some standards as the technology gestates and the 
agency learns more about it. Sunset regulation would impose binding, 
enforceable requirements in the meantime. As such, it could serve as a 
stopgap,300 allowing us to capture the public benefits that we would otherwise 
forego by deferring regulation entirely.  
Sunsets certainly are not a panacea. Like other variations on the 
regulatory process, they are susceptible to strategic behavior301 and, as 
emphasized above, the wait for more information is not always worthwhile. 
But sunsets decrease the costs of premature or incorrect regulation by time-
limiting the damage they can inflict. Moreover, the argument that temporary 
regulation would generate too much uncertainty for industry is tempered by 
the reality that sunset laws can always be reauthorized or extended, and that 
“permanent” regulation can always be amended or repealed.302 Finally, 
wrapping the temporary policy in a regulation rather than a guidance would 
make it more durable.303 Had the FDA taken this approach with software, it 
could have provided a much-needed regulatory backbone—one that would 
be enforceable but also amenable to occasional updates as computing 
advanced. 
 
errors, and this is particularly likely to be the case in policy contexts dominated by 
uncertainty”). 
 298. See id. at 269–72 (noting that “new policy initiatives are often enacted in the 
immediate aftermath of realized or recognized risks” and that “staged decision procedures 
are utilized as compensation mechanisms for conditions of uncertainty in many other fields,” 
citing examples). 
 299. Id. at 259–60. 
 300. See id. at 273–74. 
 301. See id. at 275; LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 203–06 (2011) (critiquing sunset legislation in the tax 
code). 
 302. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, supra note 296, at 261. 
 303. Gersen addresses durability in light of public choice theory and the political 
calculations it can generate. See id. at 279–86. 
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2. Deadlines 
To address the concern that an agency’s initial restraint will calcify into a 
long-term laissez faire posture, Congress might set a regulatory deadline for 
the agency. Congress frequently does.304  
The scant scholarship scrutinizing regulatory deadlines suggests that they 
have both advantages and limitations, particularly on the procedures agencies 
use, the extent of public participation, and the duration of the agency’s 
action.305 Their most obvious advantage is to confront persistent agency 
delay.306 Deadlines can be desirable when “it is more important that a rule 
exist than it be right.”307 Congress has imposed deadlines on numerous 
agencies, particularly the EPA.308 The most familiar FDA examples are the 
various statutory deadlines for approving new drug approval applications 
(“NDAs”),309 which demonstrate the dynamics between the agency and the 
pharmaceutical industry.310 
Congressional deadlines can counterbalance barriers to challenging 
agency delay or inaction.311 Jacob Gersen and Anne O’Connell found that 
although deadlines speed up agency action only modestly, the impact on 
HHS rulemaking is remarkable, reducing the average length by more than 
forty percent (from 817 days to 445 days).312 Procedurally, deadlines tend to 
correlate with interim final rules, which legally bind while the agency gathers 
public comments.313 Deadlines also correlate with more comment periods, 
 
 304. See Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 545; Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 204. 
 305. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 204, at 942–49. 
 306. Id. at 927. 
 307. Id. at 971 (noting that such cases can be rare). 
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Department of Commerce). 
 309. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 
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 310. Daniel P. Carpenter, Groups, the Media, Agency Waiting Costs, and FDA Drug Approval, 
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quite hefty) user fees required by the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) and its 
reauthorizations. See 21 U.S.C. § 379h(c)(4) (2012); FDA, Prescription Drug User Fee Rates 
for Fiscal Year 2013, 77 Fed. Reg. 45,639, 45,642 (Aug. 1, 2012) (setting the fee for filing a 
New Drug Approval (“NDA”) application at $1,958,000 for fiscal year 2013). 
 311. See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 204, at 927–28, 951–54 (noting that deadlines 
sometimes “provide a rare opportunity for parties to successfully sue for agency inaction 
under section 706(1) of the APA”). 
 312. Id. at 945–46, 988 tbl.12. Gersen and O’Connell gathered data between April 1988 
to October 2003 from agency reports in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory 
Actions, published semiannually in the Federal Register. Id. at 938 n.57. 
 313. Id. at 943–44. 
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probably because Congress tends to use deadlines for more significant 
actions.314 
On the downside, deadlines can exacerbate the cognitive bias to 
overestimate newer, higher-profile risks over older, established ones.315 Yet, 
in the case of medical device software, the newer risks demonstrated by 
mobile technologies highlight longstanding risks with software that the FDA 
historically under-regulates.316 
Another downside is that deadlines might prompt industry efforts to 
defeat or weaken the regulation preemptively. Again, this concern is not 
overwhelming, as agencies already publish Notices of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“NPRM”) and even Advanced Notices of Proposed Rulemaking 
(“ANPRM”) that forecast their interventions.317 Interim final rules also serve 
this purpose by binding the public (hence the “final”), but only for a limited 
time (hence the “interim”).318 
In short, agencies can manipulate the durability of their policies. The 
FDA’s 1989 software policy was not durable enough, and in fact, it did not 
endure. 
D. ENFORCEMENT 
Once an agency has settled on when and how to regulate a new 
technology, it must decide how rigorously to enforce its policy. Executive 
agencies have unmistakable discretion here.319 Indeed, agency discretion may 
reach its apex versus judicial interference in matters of enforcement.320 As a 
practical matter, agency discretion is limited only by political and resource 
constraints. 
 
 314. Id. at 943. 
 315. Id. at 974. 
 316. Cortez, supra note 78 (detailing some of the risks of mobile health technologies and 
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54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1465–68 (2002); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency 
Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1065 (1986) 
(criticizing the use of ANPRM as defensive and dilatory). For a discussion of the dynamics 
of NPRM, see Gersen & Posner, supra note 146, at 587. 
 318. See Adoption of Recommendations, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,108, 43,110–12 (Aug. 18, 
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 319. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828–35 (1985); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial 
Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004). 
 320. See Bressman, supra note 319, at 1705–10 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004)). 
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But enforcement discretion still demands fidelity to the agency’s statutory 
responsibilities, and, above all, to the public interest. Agencies may be 
perfectly justified in tempering early enforcement against new technologies. 
Yet, as the innovation matures and as its risks become more evident, these 
initial justifications can become threadbare, as demonstrated by the FDA’s 
history with software. 
This argument counters several deeply rooted cultural norms about 
government regulation and technology. The overzealous regulator has long 
been an archetype in American political discourse. The idea that federal 
agencies systematically over-regulate is an old one, reaching a crescendo 
during the Reagan era,321 with a renewed vigor today. But, as Nicholas Bagley 
and Richard Revesz argue, this idea is generally wrong.322 Still, the intuition 
endures. In fact, efforts to reform federal regulation often do so primarily 
with regulated industry in mind, rather than regulatory beneficiaries.323 Some 
even argue that new technologies will generally regulate themselves.324  
It is hard not to notice the cognitive dissonance here. There is 
widespread recognition that compliance with regulations is spotty,325 and that 
agencies generally lack the resources and personnel to enforce the law 
optimally.326 Scholars have examined regulatory underenforcement in a 
number of contexts.327 Recent studies show that even when agencies do make 
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the effort to pursue violations, they frequently fail to enforce judgments and 
settlements.328 Underenforcement is often attributed to agencies being 
underfunded and understaffed.329 But agencies may be reluctant to ask for 
more resources, lest they signal their own inefficiency or create new pressures 
to produce results commensurate with new resources.330 Thus, we lament the 
overzealous regulator despite actual evidence that most are not zealous 
enough.331 
This narrative fits the FDA well. The agency has been criticized for lax 
oversight over virtually every product category in its jurisdiction, including 
food,332 drugs,333 and medical devices.334 In response, former FDA officials 
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argue that the agency suffers from “the hollow government syndrome,” 
whereby it is simultaneously saddled not only with expanding jurisdiction, 
but also with “stagnant resources and the consequent inability to implement 
or enforce its statutory mandates.”335 It can be easy to criticize an 
overwhelmed agency. 
At the same time, these excuses dissolve the longer a problem lingers. 
Underenforcement can negate the value of even optimally timed 
regulation.336 It can also erode careful decisions about the proper form and 
durability of interventions. The decision to proceed by guidance or even by 
more collaborative forms of soft regulation is easier to justify if the agency 
provides a traditional hard law backstop via binding rules or enforcement. As 
new governance proponents like Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite observe, 
“[r]egulatory agencies will be able to speak more softly when they are 
perceived as carrying big sticks.”337 Thus, while the FDA’s decision to 
address software by guidance may have been defensible in 1987 or even 
1989, it became less so over time, as software products proliferated and 
enforcement continued to lag. 
How do these lessons apply to disruptive innovation? Again, this Article 
tempers the suggestion that agencies should rely on “threats” as new 
technologies mature. The primary example Wu uses is the FCC’s early 
Internet policy, which warned Internet service providers to maintain net 
neutrality.338 Chairman Powell’s speech warned the broadband industry to 
preserve net neutrality.339 But the FCC did not make an empty threat. Just 
one year later, the FCC investigated a telephone company for violating one 
of these principles,340 citing violations of the Communications Act of 1934.341 
Shortly after the settlement, the FCC published a policy statement explaining 
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four Internet freedoms,342 which preceded a legally binding rule just six years 
later.343 The FCC buttressed the rule by enforcing it.344  
Adjudication and enforcement require sustained effort.345 The FDA has 
brought intermittent enforcement actions against software products, 
particularly via warning letters,346 but it has not pursued enough high-profile 
cases to offset its primary reliance on nonbinding (and since withdrawn) 
guidance. 
Underenforcement can undermine an agency’s credibility, and failure to 
enforce can compound other problems for agencies.347 A caution voiced 
during a recent FDA public workshop on software products was that if too 
many people do not follow the FDA’s rules, they would undermine the entire 
system.348 As noted in Part III, this is close to what happened with medical 
device software. And history risks repeating itself with the newest generation 
of software products for mobile platforms.349 
Of course, it is hard to discuss FDA enforcement without appreciating 
its gatekeeping authority over new technologies. Agencies, like the FDA, that 
enjoy preapproval power can leverage it to better enforce their policies 
whether those policies are technically binding or not.350 In the case of 
software products, the FDA’s statutory authority to pre-approve and pre-
clear devices gives it gatekeeping authority.351 FDA guidances thus demand 
respect. Yet this leverage dissolves when the FDA exempts certain products 
from premarket review, as it has with many lower risk categories of devices, 
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like the medical device data systems mentioned above.352 Gatekeeping 
leverage is less useful when the product has already passed through the gate, 
or when the gates are left wide open.353 
So, what is the best way to address suboptimal enforcement by resource-
strapped agencies like the FDA? Some commentators suggest relying on 
citizen enforcement and private rights of action.354 Nina Mendelson argues 
that expanding such mechanisms could not only increase overall 
enforcement, but also redress some of the procedural deficiencies of agencies 
relying on guidance documents.355 In effect, we could deputize citizens and 
interest groups to use private resources to enforce regulatory obligations that 
might otherwise go un- or under-enforced.356 
Currently, citizen suits are somewhat rare in administrative enforcement 
schemes, outside of environmental statutes.357 Private rights of action are also 
rare.358 However, Mendelson argues that “[r]egulatory beneficiaries’ concerns 
over inadequate agency enforcement of statutory provisions could be 
addressed by expanding citizen enforcement provisions to encompass 
obligations under a broader array of health, safety, and environmental 
laws.”359 These vehicles would remind agencies that they have constituents 
other than industry. They could also combat agency “slack.”360 Of course, it 
might be difficult for regulatory beneficiaries to “detect and document” 
regulatory violations.361 And there are other problems,362 including the reality 
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that private enforcement would probably need to be authorized by 
Congress.363 But for consumer products and markets, consumers might serve 
as early sentinels of problems.364 
In short, agencies need not be so deliberate and tentative with regulating 
innovations—even disruptive ones. If agencies are concerned with regulating 
prematurely or incorrectly, then they can experiment with timing rules, push 
Congress to authorize private enforcement, or try other adaptations of 
traditional interventions that reduce the costs of errors. If agencies do choose 
to proceed by making threats, then they should use them as a short-term 
precursor to more decisive action, as the FCC did, and guard against relying 
on them as a long-term crutch, as the FDA did. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Periodically, regulators are confronted by novel products, technologies, 
or business practices that fall within their jurisdiction but do not fit 
comfortably within their regulatory frameworks. Agencies face “regulatory 
disruption.” Many scholars and policymakers intuit that the appropriate 
response is for regulators to be cautious, not decisive. As Tim Wu recently 
argued, agencies should make “threats” to encourage desired behavior or 
discourage undesired behavior. 
Though intuitive, the idea of using “threats” as a tentative, flexible initial 
posture can easily calcify, creating a weak default position that leads to 
suboptimal regulation over longer periods. Regulatory inertia can be hard to 
break without an external shock, usually a tragedy or massive failure that 
reignites interest in regulation. 
This discussion implicates not just the FDA’s or the FCC’s consideration 
of new technologies, but other agencies’ as well. If agencies are concerned 
about regulating novel products or practices prematurely or erroneously, they 
can experiment with timing and enforcement methods to reduce the risks of 
both. Agencies can use experimental rules, regulatory sunsets, or rulemaking 
deadlines to calibrate their approach to novel technologies or business 
practices. Also, citizen suits or private rights of action might help correct 
systematic underenforcement by resource-strapped regulators, who might 
find themselves even more strapped for resources when new products, firms, 
or even industries materialize within their jurisdictions.  
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The plight of the modern regulator is to adapt old regulatory frameworks 
to new technologies and practices. This should not be as paralyzing as it 
seems.  
 
 
